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HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN U.S. LAW: THE
STATUS QUO, ITS UNDERLYING BASES, AND
PATHWAYS FOR CHANGE*
As of this day, the United States has ratified three of the major
seven global human rights treaties (HRTs).1  The three it has ratified
have been assented to only conditionally.  They have been qualified
by reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) to prevent
their direct enforcement in U.S. courts, and bring their provisions into
sync with U.S. domestic law.  This being said, the greater issues re-
main far from settled.
Limited and conditional consent to HRTs provokes controversy
in the form of two interrelated questions: first, whether U.S. RUDs
are legal under international law (the “legality question”), and, sec-
ond, why the United States has chosen not to increase domestic hu-
man rights protection through fuller adherence to HRTs (the “human
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1. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Treaty Body
Database, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet [hereinafter
Treaty Body Database].  See also The University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/ainstls1.htm.  The United States has ratified the Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/
h2catoc.htm [hereinafter CAT], the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm
[hereinafter ICCPR], and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/d1cerd.htm [hereinafter CERD].  It has signed, but not
ratified, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/
e1cedaw.htm, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 ILM 1448,
at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/k2crc.htm, and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm.  It has thus far taken no action on the In-
ternational Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families, adopted Dec. 18, 1990, 30 ILM 1517, at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/
n8icprmw.htm (all cites last visited on Apr. 9, 2003).
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rights question”).  Conditional consent to HRTs—i.e., the policy that
raises the legality question—can only be explained by answering the
human rights question.  Further, unlike the answer to the legality
question, the answer to the human rights question responds to the
assumedly desirable goal of guaranteeing the protection of human
rights.
Accordingly, this article examines various theories asserting
claims to truth as to why the United States has tendered only condi-
tional and limited consent to HRTs.  This examination of theories and
the diverse hypotheses they produce yields a socio–structural theory
of human rights.  From this theory, a policy suggestion emerges: to
construct social arrangements for a minimum substantive floor of
human rights protection.  This policy suggestion disposes of the legal-
ity question, because it effectively reinterprets U.S. RUDs in a man-
ner that satisfies applicable international rules.  Most significantly, it
directly addresses the concerns underlying the human rights question.
In times of war and external threat, domestic human rights guar-
antees have been repealed within the United States—consider, for
example, McCarthyism and Japanese internment.  Parting from the
premise that such practices are undesirable, this article assumes first
that such practices may recur during present and future threats, and,
second, that it is possible that future instances of such human rights
infringement will not be as brief.  Both assumptions are worth enter-
taining, given the ongoing and potentially protracted struggle against
terrorism in the post–September 11th era.
At its close, the article suggests that although the United States
has severely curtailed the effect of human rights treaties within its ter-
ritory, the HRTs—even in their diminished state—can serve to estab-
lish a substantive standard of human rights protection.  That standard
would be a mast to which the United States could bind itself to ensure
that a meaningful level of freedom be maintained and preserved
within its territory, come what may.
Part I contains a summary of relevant U.S. law and practice as
regards HRTs.  Part II analyzes existing explanations for this law and
practice and presents a socio–structural theory for human rights pro-
tection.  Finally, in Part III, the article surveys two existing proposals
for change and suggests a minimum floor approach for U.S. human
rights law and policy that builds off the socio–structural theory.
Given the breadth and quantity of the issues germane to this matter,
this article does not seek to arrive at definitive or exhaustive answers.
Rather, it seeks to re–conceptualize a complex problem and facilitate
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a resolution responsive to the multiple underpinnings of limited and
conditional consent, on the one hand, and the necessity for certain in-
alienable and permanent rights within the United States on the other.
I.  HRTs IN DOMESTIC LAW
Traditional U.S. judicial conceptions of international law are
both antithetical to and insistent upon the enforcement of interna-
tional human rights.  In respect to the former, the U.S. Supreme
Court has depicted international law as concerned not with domestic
rights and duties, but instead with international rights and duties.2  In
respect to the latter, the Court has declared that the rationale for fed-
eral court jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal treaties is
that “all persons who have real claims under a treaty should have
their causes decided by the national tribunals.”3
The immediate victims of human rights violations are individuals,
not states.4  As such, victims have little leverage within the confines of
international law to retaliate against states or their proxies.  Their
only remedy lies with the courts.  The United States, a nation with
courts capable of prosecuting government officials for violations of
international law,5 as well as a constitution that makes treaties the law
of the land,6 has intentionally limited the effects of HRTs in its terri-
tory.  It has done so through a policy of conditional consent carried
out through the use of RUDs.7
2. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72–73 (1941) (holding that international law
could not prevent the United States from regulating the behavior of its nationals at sea).
3. Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cran.) 344, 348 (1809).
4. The eventual consequences of human rights violations, however, are diffuse, including
economic effects, general destabilization, and subsequent effects on individuals removed from
the immediate victims.  The political consensus of the international community, as reflected by
the United Nations Instruments, reflects this.  See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 & pmbl.  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948), pmbl.
(“[D]isregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have out-
raged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the high-
est aspiration of the common people.”).
5. See Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 953 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (“There is no question that, in the second half of the twentieth century, the protec-
tions afforded individuals under international law have greatly expanded.  At one time, interna-
tional law concerned itself chiefly with relations among states, occasionally with relations be-
tween a state and citizens of other states, and almost never with a nation’s treatment of its own
citizens.  That has now changed and government officials can be held responsible for certain
egregious violations of their own citizens’ rights.” (citations omitted)).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7. To view RUDs attached to the ICCPR and CAT, see Treaty Body Database, supra
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Having been declared non-self-executing at the time of ratifica-
tion, HRTs remain presumptively unenforceable.  This can change
only if Congress enacts implementing legislation or the judiciary de-
clares an HRT self-executing, thereby defying the express will of the
political branches and their broad authority in foreign affairs.  Even
absent such legislation or judicial revolt, however, HRTs powerfully
influence judicial constructions of Congressional statutes and provide
significant support for human rights claims.8  In addition, unratified
HRTs are used to guide statutory interpretation,9 and, regardless of
implementing legislation, the provisions of human rights covenants
may form part of, but not create, customary international law
(“CIL”), which provides the rules of decision in some cases.10
Although existing congressional acts and constitutional protec-
tions implement many of the norms found in HRTs,11 norms con-
tained in HRTs not protected under U.S. domestic law have been
subjected to RUDs, with one exception.12  This overwhelming trend
note 1.
8. HRTs can be used to help construe relevant “constitutional, statutory, common law, or
other legal provisions.”  Paust, infra note 51, at 781.  Courts should generally strive to give effect
to both international law and other legal authorities.  Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982); Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cran.) 64 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cran.) 1 (1801).  For
example, the judges in Kadic cited the right to be free from torture as a jus cogens norm and
stated that congressional enactments must be construed to be consistent with this prohibition.
See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
9. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 593 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “[a] treaty
has been sometimes said to have force of law only if ratified.  Courts, however, often use non-
ratified treaties as aids in statutory construction” and citing numerous circuit court opinions that
support the proposition).
10. See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (“[the] United states courts may not ignore the pre-
cepts of customary international law”).
11. To name four: the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 provides U.S. nationals
with a cause of action for acts of “international terrorism.”  Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506
(1992) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1992)).  Second, Congress carved an exception into the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act allowing suits against foreign governments on the State De-
partment’s list of terrorist states.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1994 & Supp. 1998).  Third, the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (1992)), allows individual plaintiffs, both citizens and aliens, to raise claims of official tor-
ture and extrajudicial killing against aliens under either the Alien Torts Claims Act and federal
question jurisdiction generally [hereinafter TVPA].  See Jennifer Correale, The Torture Victim
Protection Act: a Vital Contribution to International Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice
Gesture?, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 197, 211 (1994).  Fourth, and of particular interest, is the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), which provides federal subject matter jurisdiction
when an alien sues for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations [hereinafter ATCA].
See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.  Additionally, reference must be made to the Bill of Rights as offering
significant protection of human rights.  See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
12. The United States has enacted implementing legislation for Article 3 of CAT through
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has prevented the creation of additional human rights within the
United States.  The reasons provided for this conditional consent
policy are, at best, incomplete, and the potential consequences of this
policy are troubling, especially if domestic human rights guarantees
continue to decline.13  Before explaining this curtailment of the power
of HRTs and its consequences, a brief look should be taken at the
relevant law.
A. The Constitutional Power of Treaties
Treaties ratified by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate are “the supreme Law of the Land” and “judges in every
State shall be bound thereby.”14  The power to make treaties is vested
in the President, but limited by the requirement that two–thirds of the
Senators present concur with the President’s judgment.15  Cases aris-
ing under treaties may be heard by the federal courts,16 and the Su-
preme Court is therefore the authoritative interpreter of treaties.17
Pronouncements of the Supreme Court have authoritatively
elaborated upon these basic tenants of treaty law.  The Constitution
takes precedence over any treaty,18 yet treaties are afforded great
weight.  International law, including treaties, is “part of our law” and
the courts are charged with ascertaining and administering it.19  Trea-
the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G, 112,
Stat. 2681, 2681–761, § 2242 (Oct. 21, 1998) [hereinafter FARR].  Article 3 provides in relevant
part that “no State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture.”  See UNHCHR website, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2003).  The Act has been successfully invoked by individual plaintiffs against U.S.
government officials.  See, e.g., Al-Saher v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 268 F.3d
1143 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an alien who meets the burden of proof in showing that he has
been tortured while detained in his multiple arrests and that he is likely to be arrested again if
returned to his native country is entitled to a withholding of removal under CAT, as imple-
mented by FARR).
13. Professor Georg Nolte was fond of asking, in his course on Comparative Constitutional
Systems at the Duke-Geneva Institute in Transnational Law, Summer 2002, how it is that
Americans can be so certain that their democracy and its protection of individual rights would
continue to flourish.  This question, coupled with what I perceive to be a decline of domestic
human rights post September 11th, informs my suggestion for reconciling international legal
obligations with the policy of conditional consent to HRTs.  See Part III, infra.
14. See U.S. CONST., supra note 6.
15. Id. art. II, § 2 (The President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”).
16. Id. art. III, § 2.
17. Id. art. III, §§ 1 and 2.
18. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
19. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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ties supersede inconsistent state laws and inconsistent state constitu-
tions,20 as well as inconsistent federal statutes.21  However, inconsis-
tent federal statutes enacted subsequent to a given treaty supersede
the relevant part of the treaty.22  The hierarchy between treaties and
federal statutes is therefore temporally determined such that the “last
in time” prevails.23
Three additional points of law should be made.  First, executive
agreements, although considered treaties for purposes of interna-
tional law, are not treaties for purposes of U.S. law.24  Second, the ju-
diciary occupies a precarious position in hearing cases that concern
treaty law, since matters of “foreign relations” have been held to be
among the “non justiciable political questions” in which the judiciary
will not intervene.25  Third, CIL occupies a lower position than treaty
law and applies only when no legislation or applicable precedent
speaks to the issue.26  Respecting the latter, CIL is considered federal
law,27 and appears in the Constitution (referred to as “the law of na-
20. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
21. The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (5 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870) (“A treaty may super-
sede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”).  See also
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
22. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 621.
23. See id. at 599.  See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193–94 (1888) (“[The act of
Congress] was passed after the treaty with the Dominican Republic, and, if there be any conflict
between the stipulations of the treaty or the requirements of the law, the latter must control.”);
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 (“an Act of Con-
gress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and . . . when a statute which is subsequent in time is
inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
24. Executive agreements: those agreements concluded by the President either through
“commander and chief” powers or on the basis of authorization from Congress.  See Weinber-
ger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (explaining the presidential authority to make agreements with
other nations and the domestic effects thereof).
25. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249.  See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (non–
justiciable political question involves: “[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question”); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (holding that foreign policy decisions are not apt for the ju-
diciary).
26. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666–70 (1992); United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 65 (1833) (“A detailed examination of the maxims of customary interna-
tional law . . . is not called for, in the presence of an express treaty stipulation;”).
27. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423–25 (1964) (noting that,
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tions”), which gives Congress the power to define its terms and pun-
ish those who violate it.28
B. Limits Imposed Through Conditional Consent: Non-Self-
Execution and Forced Conformity with Pre–Existing Domestic
Standards
Through RUDs, each party to a treaty can modify, limit, clarify,
or preemptively define how the treaty applies to them.  In U.S. law,
the Senate and President negotiate the ratification of a treaty and the
Senate has the power to impose RUDs.  The inclusion in a treaty of
RUDs therefore constitutes a precondition to the U.S.’ consent to
ratify.  Yet, under both customary and treaty–based international law,
RUDs that limit, qualify, or contradict the treaty obligations of a
party are considered reservations,29 and reservations are invalid if
they are prohibited by the treaty’s text or defeat its object and pur-
pose.30  RUDs made by the Senate become part of the treaty itself,
and, therefore, the treaty, as it is intended to apply to the United
States, ceases to be a template document, and becomes instead a
“corrected version” at the time of ratification.31
The ICCPR, CERD, and CAT each require the provision of an
impartial forum to address individual claims and provide a responsive
remedy when a claim prevails.32  These provisions, coupled with the
although the law of nations governs state-to-state relations and therefore cannot control how a
country treats a wrong within its own borders, “it is, of course, true that United States courts
apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances” and holding that “an
issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and
the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  As a textual matter, the law of nations clause would appear to
relate only to criminal matters.
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313 cmt. g (1986)
(“When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a unilateral decla-
ration that does not purport to be a reservation.  Whatever it is called, it constitutes a reserva-
tion in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or modify the state’s legal obligation.”) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
30. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
337 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  The object and purpose are determined by the arbiter
designated by the treaty itself or with default authority to preside over the controversy, often a
regional or international court, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
31. See infra notes 235, 236, and 232 and accompanying text.  The notion that the “cor-
rected version” applies becomes controversial only for RUDs that may be invalid.  See Part
IIIA, infra.
32. See CAT arts. 8 and 14; ICCPR arts. 2 and 14; CERD art. 6, supra note 1.  See John
Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42
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status granted to treaties by the Constitution, required the United
States to declare HRTs non-self-executing and to limit key terms to
their constitutional definition so that judicial obligations beyond
those provided for in domestic law could be avoided.
Since their advent, the Senate has indeed either refused to ratify
HRTs or declared them non-self-executing through the use of
RUDs.33  For each of the three HRTs it has ratified,34 the United
States has issued more reservations than any other party.35  It has de-
clared all judicially relevant provisions of these HRTs non-self-
executing.36  The Senate report relevant to the ICCPR explains the in-
tent behind one such declaration:
For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration
that the substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-
executing.  The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create
a private cause of action in U.S. courts.  As was the case with the
DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1296 (1993) (With respect to the ICCPR, “[t]his means, at a minimum,
that a court may not permit prosecution and conviction for an act protected under the Cove-
nant, and that a court may entertain a suit by a person whose Covenant rights are violated and
provide injunctive and compensatory relief.”).
33. Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 593.  See also Steven M. Schneebaum, Human Rights in the
United States Courts: The Role of Lawyers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 738 (1998) (“The trea-
ties to which the United States is a party that contain human rights elements either expressly or
by implication are not self-executing”).  This trend began alongside a state supreme court deci-
sion declaring the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter non-self-executing.  See Sei Fujii
v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).  Notwithstanding RUDs, a fundamental principle of interna-
tional law serves to limit the direct effects of HRTs: it is generally required that individuals ex-
haust local remedies before pursuing a claim under an international agreement, both for indi-
vidual complaints and for state-to-state complaints.  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 703
cmt. d (1986).  The rule of exhaustion of local remedies—often a preliminary objection before
the International Court of Justice—is well established in international law as applied between
states.  See, e.g., Interhandle Case (Switzerland v. United States), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 26–29 (Mar. 21).
34. See Treaty Body Database, supra note 1 (providing electronic access for the ICCPR,
CAT, and CERD).
35. See Catherine Redgwell, US Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: all for one and
none for all?, forthcoming in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 394 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (commenting that the
United States is the leader in RUDs among States Parties to the Torture Convention, the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the ICCPR) (on file with author).  See
Treaty Body Database, supra note 1 (cataloguing all reservations to HRTs).  Still, the United
States can make a reasonable claim that its existing domestic laws fully satisfy U.S. obligations
pursuant to HRTs.  Such a claim would have three main components.  First, none of the RUDs
undermine the existing level of human rights protections absent the HRTs.  For example, the
existing RUDs could be contrasted to a hypothetical RUD reserving the right to torture crimi-
nal suspects.  Second, the great majority of the HRT provisions have not been subjected to
RUDs, indicating that most of the treaty will be observed, albeit through existing laws, rather
than implementing legislation.  Finally, the reservations tailor the treaty so as to bring it into
sync with domestic law, enabling domestic legal codes to satisfy the HRTs’ terms as applied.
36. See Treaty Body Database, supra note 1.
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Torture Convention, existing U.S. law generally complies with the
Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated.37
The unwillingness to create an individual cause of action itself
requires explanation, yet none is given other than “prudence.”38  Pru-
dence suggests the avoidance of possible debacles, and just one sen-
tence later, it is conceded that existing law “generally,” (presumably
meaning not fully), “complies with the Covenant.”39  Since general
compliance does not equal full compliance, the refusal to contemplate
implementing legislation amounts to a refusal to fully implement the
Covenant.40
For purposes of supporting human rights claims in U.S. courts, a
self-executing treaty is one addressed to the judiciary41 and/or one for
which “no domestic legislation is required to give . . . [it] the force of
law in the United States.”42  The “and/or” qualification exists because
different administrations, in their declarations to human rights cove-
nants, attached different meanings to the term “non-self-executing.”43
Such a declaration is of great import, although its international legal
validity is uncertain.  Indeed, ambiguity and uncertainty obscure the
law of non-self-execution.44
With regard to the ICCPR, the U.S. circuit courts stand divided
on the issue of domestic enforceability.45  While the First and the
Tenth Circuits have confirmed that the ICCPR does not provide a
37. STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102ND CONGRESS, REPORT
ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 102 (1992), reprinted in
31 ILM 645, 657 (1992).
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. This explains the necessity of this RUD (a non-self-execution declaration), yet the rea-
sons behind this conditional consent require explanation.  See Part II, infra.
41. The Supreme Court has held that some treaties are directed to “the political, not the
judicial department” and that these require implementing legislation in order for the courts to
apply them.  See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pete.) 253, 314 (1829) (holding that treaties not
addressed to the judiciary are those that constitute a contract between the state parties regard-
ing a particular course of action).
42. Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 252.
43. David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing
Treaties and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 137–38 (1999).
44. See, e.g., Carolos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT’L. L. 695 (1995) (“[M]uch of the doctrinal disarray and judicial confusion is attribut-
able to the failure of the courts and commentators to recognize that for some time four distinct
‘doctrines’ of self-executing treaties have been masquerading as one.”).
45. See Margaret Thomas, Comment, ‘Rogue States’ Within American Borders: Remedying
State Noncompliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 165, 203–07 (2002).
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private right of action,46 the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have been
willing to apply it and, in one case, looked to the Human Rights
Committee (“HRC”)47 for an authoritative interpretation of its
terms.48
Still, it is traditionally understood that “unless a treaty is self-
executing, it must be implemented by legislation before it can give
rise to a private right of action enforceable in a court of the United
States.”49  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states
definitively that non-self-executing treaties are not directly enforce-
able: “Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to interna-
tional law and to international agreements of the United States, ex-
cept that a ‘non-self-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as
law in the absence of necessary implementation.”50  Even in the ab-
sence of such implementation, a non-self-executing treaty can be ap-
plied directly, without becoming dispositive, in U.S. courts,51 and for-
eign states may in some cases invoke such treaties even though
individuals cannot.52  Furthermore, a State’s failure to promptly im-
46. Id.  See United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135
(1982); Kyler v. Montezuma County, No. 99-1052, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1145, at *4 (10th Cir.
Jan. 28, 2000) (the ICCPR’s provisions “do not, by their terms, confer rights upon individual
citizens.”).
47. The HRC is the international body charged with, among other things, interpreting the
ICCPR.  For a list of the treaty bodies and a description of their activities, see the UNHCHR
website, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/convmech.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
48. Thomas, supra note 45, at 203–05 (cataloguing Ninth and Eleventh Circuit cases).  See,
e.g., Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441–03 (9th Cir. 1996) (inter-
preting the ICCPR); Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) (ap-
plying the ICCPR); Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the ICCPR), cert.
granted, Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001) (not touching on the issue of the ICCPR’s en-
forceability); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282–09 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying the
ICCPR, despite citing to the non self-execution RUD, and looking to the HRC for guidance on
the ICCPR’s meaning).  Cf. United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991).
49. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976), cited in
Jama v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998).  See
Foster, 27 U.S. at 253 (interpreting Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution as providing the basis
for this treaty rule).
50. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 111.3 (1986).
51. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988)
(providing an alternative reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence, leading to the conclusion
that the court has never failed to apply a treaty based on a non-self-executing status).  The prac-
tice of affording significant, but not binding, force to treaties is consistent with the general rule
that international law may constitute “persuasive authority in American courts,” although it is
rarely binding.  See Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks before the Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Law Institute (May 15, 2002) (on file with the librarian of the American Law Institute).
52. United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[U]nless a treaty
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plement a non-self-executing treaty can result in default under its
treaty obligations.53
Even so, the declaration attached to the treaty as deposited at
the United Nations provides powerful evidence that the HRTs are
not self-executing, as it satisfies the relevant tests for determining the
enforceability status of a treaty.54  Its legality under international law,
however, is another matter.  A potential conflict between domestic
and international law is thus signaled.55
In addition to declarations that render treaties non-self-
executing, the United States has issued RUDs stipulating that a given
provision or phrase must be interpreted identically to constitutional
provisions covering similar topics.  For example, a U.S. RUD to CAT
states that:
the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under ar-
ticle 16 to prevent “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment,” only in so far as the term “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment” means the cruel, unusual and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.56
This “forced conformity” RUD raises the interpretational issue
of whether the RUD refers to the meaning of the amendments refer-
enced as their common law interpretation stood at the date of ratifica-
tion, or whether it refers to the unpredictable and ongoing process of
elucidation of meaning inherent in the common law system.57
The question of how to construe an RUD is distinct from the
question of whether a court might strike down or invalidate an RUD,
thus excluding it from the treaty.  The notion, raised by the U.S. cir-
cuit courts,58 that the Supreme Court might invalidate the Senate’s
RUDs seems legally fantastical.  The power to attach conditions to
or intergovernmental agreement is ‘self-executing’ . . . an individual citizen does not have
standing to protest when one nation does not follow the terms of such agreement.  Only Panama
could invoke [the agreement,] and it evinces no such inclination”).
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, §111, Reporters’ Note 5 (1986).
54. See id. § 111.4 A, B, and C (1986) (explaining that an international agreement is non-
self-executing “(a) if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation, (b) if the Senate in giving con-
sent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation, or (c) if it is con-
stitutionally required”).
55. See Part III, infra.
56. See Treaty Body Database, supra note 1.
57. This question has great relevance for the notion of a minimum floor for human rights
within the United States, and is discussed in Part III, infra.
58. See supra notes 45–48 and corresponding text.
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the ratification of treaties, granted to the Senate by the Constitution,
could be seen as empty if the conditions attached were not honored.
Despite the admission that “it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cog-
nizance,”59 the conduct of foreign relations lies at the core of the po-
litical branches’ powers.  The Supreme Court has stated that the con-
duct of foreign relations is confined to the political branches,60 that
foreign policy decisions are not apt for the judiciary,61 and that a
treaty that does not confer a private right of action is unenforceable.62
Yet, it does not necessarily follow that the power to attach conditions
and refuse ratification includes an uninhibited right to attach any
conditions; rather, this power may be properly limited to certain per-
missible conditions.63
The Senate’s lack of reference to international law governing the
legality of RUDs creates a tension between domestic practice and in-
ternational law.  Specifically, reservations contrary to the object and
purpose of any treaty are illegal under international law.64  Although
the treaty power can be criticized as undemocratic,65 the most power-
59. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
60. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
61. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. at 111.
62. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (“A treaty . . . depends for the enforce-
ment of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to
it. . . .  But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or
subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the
nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the
courts of the country.”).
63. See Part IIIA, infra.
64. Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 14 (widely acknowledged to constitute CIL).
See also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28) (“The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit
both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them.  It follows that it is the
compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish
the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the
appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.  Such is the rule of conduct which must
guide every State in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint,
of the admissibility of any reservation.  Any other view would lead either to the acceptance of
reservations which frustrate the purposes which the General Assembly and the contracting par-
ties had in mind, or to recognition that the parties to the Convention have the power of exclud-
ing from it the author of a reservation, even a minor one, which may be quite compatible with
those purposes.”).
65. This critique is based on the fact that a mere one-third plus one of the senators present
may prevent U.S. ratification unless their terms are included.  Executive agreements which of
course bind the United States, are far more undemocratic, however.  See LISA MARTIN,
DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 57 (2000)
(“Because members of Congress are not by law involved in consultations during the negotiation
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ful critique is that, if read expansively, it facilitates violations of inter-
national law and transnational discord.66
Indeed, it is questionable whether and to what extent the consti-
tutional definition of “treaties” coincides with the definition under in-
ternational law.  The constitutional definition differs from the generic
international definition in that only treaties to which the Senate con-
sents are considered “treaties” under U.S. law.  But if these defini-
tions conflict in other ways, RUDs incompatible with the object and
purpose of a treaty might not technically form part of a treaty, and
the U.S. judiciary would be obligated to disregard them if it—or the
hypothetical authoritative international arbiter—determined that
they were invalid under this standard.  The current reality, in which
RUDs excluded from a treaty are still applied domestically,67 could
change.  Because of the changing nature of sovereignty and uncertain
status of international law’s domestic role, it is important to under-
stand the argument in favor of the judiciary reinterpreting (and effec-
tively destroying) the Senate’s unchecked power to attach terms and
conditions to treaties.68
II.  THE UNDERLYING BASES OF CONDITIONAL CONSENT
As shown in the foregoing Part, U.S. law reserves a high place
for treaties and, accordingly, imposes procedural constraints on their
ratification.  Nowhere does U.S. law mandate conditional consent to
HRTs.  Conditional consent is thus properly termed a “policy,” in
that it is a course of action informed not only by legal norms, but also
by the interests of decision makers and their constituencies.69  The
former have been described as normative factors, delivering “the im-
pact that shared norms, and the processes by which those norms are
of executive agreements, and often do not have to vote on them, it seems plausible to interpret
them as one of the tools presidents use when they wish to avoid congressional scrutiny”).  Inci-
dentally, Martin suggests that the “actual nature of legislative influence” is such that the presi-
dent cannot evade the legislature so easily.  Id.  Martin’s quantitative model suggests that “the
president’s ability to conclude treaties is significantly related to his support in the House, but
not to his support in the Senate.”  Id. at 74.  If this is so, then the treaty power would appear
more democratic in practice than it does on its face.
66. This is so because, as stated above, reservations potentially invalid under international
law are binding on domestic courts’ interpretation of the treaty.
67. See Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation,
56 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1176–77 (1956).
68. See Part IIIA, infra.
69. Robert O. Keohane, Comment, International Relations and International Law: Two
Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487 (1997).
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interpreted, have on state policies.”70  The latter have been described
as instrumentalist factors, generated by the “use [of] the rules of in-
ternational law [by states] as instruments to attain their interests.”71
This Part contains an analysis of these norms and interests.  The
analysis focuses on explanatory value and thereby provides a piece of
the answer to the human rights question posed at the outset of this ar-
ticle.72  A final socio–structural theory of human rights protection is
then proposed to supplement the existing theories by responding
more fully to the human rights question.  This final theory informs
Part III, which reviews two proposed solutions to the controversy and
suggests a third.
A. Normative Explanations
1. The Federalist Papers and the separation of powers.  The
Federalists’ view of human nature, specifically Madison’s, proved
persuasive as to the necessity of checks and balances on the exercise
of power and strict attention to procedural mechanisms for protecting
the same.73  It is not difficult to imagine why this would be so, given
the historical context of the founding and the significance of
independence and self–governance.
Most concretely, Madisonian principles informed the contours of
domestic sovereignty, as institutionalized in U.S. law.  In a debate at
the time of the Jay Treaty, Hamilton insisted that the “House of Rep-
resentatives have no moral power to refuse the execution of a treaty
which is not contrary to the Constitution.”74  The House, under the
70. Id. at 488.
71. Id.
72. The challenge in examining these theories is to move up and down the various levels of
abstraction they present, asking all the while, “how do these different arrangements and proc-
esses interrelate?”  The goal is to avoid becoming entrenched in any one level of analysis.  On
the one hand, one risks being detained in a thicket of unsettled law and procedural intricacies.
On the other, the risk is in getting stuck pondering the immensity of over-arching, almost meta-
physical, constructs of power, sovereignty, and anarchy—a vision of countries as anthropomor-
phized unitary actors on a Tolkein-esque playing board.  See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE
SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (40th Anniversary ed., 2000).  One must keep in mind that inter-
national policy is a circular phenomenon: norms affect preferences and preferences affect
norms.  Further, preferences generate and affect institutions, and those institutions, in turn, af-
fect preferences.  Countries are not unitary actors; strategies to affect policies must address both
internal norms and exogenous preferences.  Both agency and social structure (or socialization)
must be examined.
73. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing the separation of powers).
74. WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 566 (J.C. Hamilton ed., 1851), and 5 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 771 (1796), quoted in LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
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leadership of Madison, concluded that “it is the Constitutional right
and duty of the House of Representatives [when a treaty purports to
regulate on a subject within the power of Congress] to deliberate on
the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect,
and to determine and act thereon, as, in their judgment, may be most
conducive to the public good.”75  This debate contextualizes the sepa-
rate but related roles of the Senate’s advice and consent power, and
foreshadows the significant difficulties HRTs face in both houses of
Congress.
The tripartite model of government “insure[s] that a wide variety
of groups and interests . . . participate in decision–making processes[,
and] by assigning most of the governing authority to a Congress di-
vided between a Senate and a House, the Constitution further facili-
tated the intrusion of parochial considerations into the making of for-
eign policy.”76  If the Constitution did not require the approval of
two–thirds of the Senators present, surely more treaties would be
concluded.  This is supported by the comparatively large number of
executive agreements, which do not require the Senate’s consent.77  It
may well be that countries with an unhampered executive branch
conclude more treaties, but the meaning of those treaties would be
diminished since a commitment without legislative consent may lack
credibility.78  Furthermore, in dualist countries, such as the United
Kingdom where all treaties are non-self-executing,79 such a commit-
ment would be less meaningful.  Under the British rule, a declaration
of non-self-execution would be superfluous, whereas under the
American rule such a declaration materially diminishes a treaty’s ef-
fect—at least insofar as the treaty contemplates a right or duty or an
enforcement or interpretive mechanism absent from domestic law.
The purpose of the American rule is to avoid treaty violations,80 and
the advent of RUDs, in turn, prevents the American rule from caus-
ing the United States to exclude itself completely from all treaties that
205 (2d ed. 1996).
75. HENKIN, supra note 74, at 205 (“[t]he resolution was reaffirmed in 1871, Cong. Globe,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1871)”).
76. Paul E. Peterson, The President’s Dominance in Foreign Policy Making, 109 POLITICAL
SCIENCE Q. 215, 219 (1994).
77. LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN
FOREIGN POLICY 45 (1986); LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE 41–46 (1984).
78. See MARTIN, supra note 65, at 57.
79. Vazquez, supra note 44, at 697.
80. Id. at 698.
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do not entirely comport with its interests.
In sum, the American rule and Madisonian principles create an
environment in which treaties have great impact and must be agree-
able to a wide section of interests.  The first of these features compli-
cates the second, since one can logically assume that a high degree of
impact by an international commitment translates into a high amount
of debate.  This increases the temptation to resort to RUDs, since
RUDs enable compromises to be reached and prevent an ‘all or
nothing’ pattern of ratification.
2. HRTs as contracts, not legislation.  The legal environment
described above welcomes a contract theory of treaties.  U.S. views
on whether treaties are more analogous to contracts or legislation
provide an additional component of a normative explanation for U.S.
policy on HRTs.
A contracts approach would, all things being equal, provide par-
ties with maximum flexibility in customizing HRTs.  Under this ap-
proach, HRTs would be interpreted like contracts—through a “sub-
jective, party–oriented approach,”81 seeking to give effect to parties’
intent, insofar as it could be objectively ascertained.  A contracts ap-
proach presupposes that parties come to the table with defined inter-
ests and that they attempt to realize those interests through a legally
binding arrangement.  In spite of this, the contracts approach is dis-
tinctly normative in application to domestic contracts, since it is in-
formed by, and conducted in accordance with an uncontroversial un-
derstanding and use of rules.  But, these same rules are controversial
as applied to international law and, thus, a contracts approach is in-
strumental and exceptional when applied to HRTs.
Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes note that
In earlier times, the principal function of treaties was to record bi-
lateral (or sometimes regional) political settlements and arrange-
ments.  But in recent decades, the focus of treaty practice has
moved to multilateral regulatory agreements addressing com-
plex . . . political and social problems that require cooperative ac-
tion among states over time.  Chief among the areas of concern
are . . . human rights.82
In this sense, HRTs embody a qualitative change from bilateral
agreements to multilateral codes establishing global standards.
81. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 85 (2001).
82. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 1 (1995).
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Chayes likens the treaty–making process of today to “legislation in a
democratic polity” in which “parties not only weigh the benefits and
burdens of commitment, but also explore, redefine, and sometimes
discover their interests.  It is, at its best, a learning process in which
not only national positions but also conceptions of national interest
evolve and change.”83
Consistent with Chayes’ legislation approach is the establishment
of six treaty bodies, one for each of the HRTs.84  Composed of inde-
pendent experts from around the world, the treaty bodies monitor
parties’ compliance through the receipt of periodic reports, examine
information from third–party sources, and issue concluding observa-
tions with which parties are expected to comply.85  Treaty bodies in-
terpret HRTs through adopting “general comments or recommenda-
tions in which they share their views about the concrete meaning of
specific articles of the treaty.”86  HRTs contemplate not only super–
national interpretation but super–national bargaining, as well.  The ob-
servation that HRTs are multilateral instruments interpreted by su-
pranational bodies partially discredits the contracts approach.
Nevertheless, HRTs are dissimilar to legislation for the simple
reason that states do “contract” into them.  Unlike Security Council
resolutions, HRTs are not automatically binding on the international
community.87  Even if the multilateral treaty making process entails an
exploration and, possibly, re–definition of interests, states have a
choice as to whether they wish to be subjected to any given treaty.88
Despite the qualitative change from bilateral agreements to mul-
tilateral agreements complete with supranational supervisory bodies,
the United States maintains a contracts approach to treaties, severely
qualifying its consent to treaty provisions through RUDs and insisting
that domestic courts honor its pre–determined intent.  The Human
83. Id. at 4–5.
84. See UNHCR website, supra note 47.
85. See Treaty Bodies in a Nutshell, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ html/menu2/ con-
vmech.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
86. Id.
87. Although Security Council resolutions only become binding on a state once it has be-
come a member of the U.N., the great majority of states do not participate in the formation of
the resolutions.  Upon joining the U.N., states proffer “meta-consent” to whatever the Security
Council will decide in the future.
88. This autonomy is greater than that possessed by domestic states that are bound by fed-
eral law in the United States.  Admittedly, treaties purporting to codify custom would constitute
an exception to this line of reasoning.
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Rights Committee (HRC),89 the treaty body empowered to interpret
the ICCPR, has condemned this practice, signaling a conflict between
the legislation and contracts approaches:
Reservations often reveal a tendency of States not to want to
change a particular law.  And sometimes that tendency is elevated
to a general level of policy.  Of particular concern are widely for-
mulated reservations which essentially render ineffective all Cove-
nant rights which would require any change in national law to en-
sure compliance with Covenant obligations.  No real international
rights or obligations have thus been accepted.  And when there is
an absence of provisions to ensure that Covenant rights may be
sued on in domestic courts, and . . . a failure to allow individual
complaints . . . , all the essential elements  of the Covenant gauran-
tees have been removed.90
This comment undermines the contract approach, or at least its ex-
treme manifestation in which parties act with absolute autonomy.  At
minimum, the comment reminds parties that, even under a contract
approach, international law governs contracts between nations.  Al-
though it could be argued that HRTs are contracts common to many
nations creating rights that vest in individuals citizens, and are thus
not properly termed contracts between nations, international law still
governs since the rights created arise from treaties and the Vienna
Convention governs treaty law.  In either case, the HRC’s general
comments apply to all States Parties.  The fact that HRTs mandate
compliance with the opinions of a supranational body, creates tension
between HRTs and the U.S. approach to treaty law.91
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides qualified nor-
mative support for the U.S. contracts approach.  In the Reservations
89. See UNHCR website, supra note 47.  Under the legislation approach, the HRC can be
viewed as an administrative agency empowered to oversee and facilitate the implementation of
legislation, here the ICCPR, approved by a supranational legislature, the UN General Assem-
bly.  Under a contract approach, it might be seen as an enforcement–deficient arbitral body
whose existence is stipulated to in the contract itself.
90. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment 24].
91. Recall from Part IB, supra, that the prevailing domestic view appears to be that the
Senate could attach RUDs invalid under international law (as contrary to the object and pur-
pose of the treaty).  See Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 19(c), which would nonetheless
be honored by domestic courts.  See generally HENKIN, supra note 74.  Again, the rationale be-
hind this argument is ostensibly that the Senate has an implied power to attach any conditions it
wishes to its approval of a treaty and expect them to be honored, because it has the express
power to attach conditions or withhold ratification altogether.  The logic behind this assertion is
debatable, however, since the mere fact that a government entity has sole discretion to conduct
or to refuse a certain action does not necessarily lead to the proposition that it has the power to
undertake that same action in any way it pleases.
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to the Genocide Convention Case, the ICJ indicated that a state may
suspend the operation of the Genocide Convention between itself
and another state by objecting to reservations entered by that state.92
This advisory opinion, though narrowly tailored to address only the
Genocide Convention,93 conforms to the dictates of Articles 20 and 21
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,94 as noted by the
HRC.95
The HRC has clarified that this approach to dealing with reserva-
tions is inappropriate in the particular context of HRTs, because
“such treaties . . . are not a web of inter–State exchanges of mutual
obligations.”96  The formation of contracts implies bargaining for mu-
tual benefit.  Legislation, however, does not necessarily serve to nar-
rowly benefit the parties responsible for its enactment.  Rather, it
pursues some public good and is enacted by representatives to man-
date a solution to a broad problem, often a problem whose effects
emanate from a source that cannot be influenced by contracts be-
tween affected parties.  This is also the case with HRTs.
HRTs combat the problem of human rights abuse.  Victims of
such abuse may be powerless to bind their abusers to contracts ille-
galizing such abuse.97  The HRC confirmed this by stating that HRTs
“concern the endowment of individuals with rights,”98 therefore “the
principle of inter–State reciprocity has no place.”99  Consequently
“[t]he absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is
either compatible or incompatible with [an HRT’s] object and pur-
92. See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 21, 26–7 (“It is well estab-
lished that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent, and that conse-
quently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto. . . .  As
no State can be bound by a reservation to which it has not consented, it necessarily follows that
each State objecting to it will or will not, on the basis of its individual appraisal within the limits
of the criterion of the object and purpose stated above, consider the reserving State to be a
party to the Convention. . . .  Finally, it may be that a State, whilst not claiming that a reserva-
tion is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, will nevertheless object to
it, but that an understanding between that State and the reserving State will have the effect that
the Convention will enter into force between them, except for the clauses affected by the reser-
vation.”).
93. Id. at 20.
94. Vienna Convention, supra note 30, arts. 20, 21.
95. General Comment 24, supra note 90, ¶ 16.
96. Id. ¶ 17.
97. States or state actors are the usual perpetrators of human rights abuses and will there-
fore not always be capable or willing to self-police.  It is therefore evident that super-national
input can facilitate freedom from human rights abuse.
98. General Comment 24, supra note 90, ¶ 17.
99. Id.
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pose.”100  In sum, HRTs are legislation, but it is conceivable that states
might be confused by the disjuncture between ICJ precedent and the
Vienna Convention, on the one hand, and the pronouncements of the
HRC, on the other.
This entire inquiry—that of contracts versus legislation—could
be criticized as preference dependent, since, if the United States con-
sidered treaties to be legislation and felt it could not freely attach as
many RUDs, it might simply not adhere to any HRT.  But, if norms
and legal institutions influence preferences, then this theory has high
explanatory value.
3. Textual socialization: a short and primarily procedural
Constitution.  A comparison of the German and U.S. constitutions
points to the role of national experience and the circularity of norms
and preferences.  As such, it rounds out this first group of theories
and segues to the second group, those described as instrumentalist.
Still, it belongs within the normative category, since constitutions,
although embodying values and goals, are the normative framework
with which all domestic values and goals must contend.
The objectives of the U.S. Constitution included “to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty.”101  It is quite short and as such may provide
less explicit guidance on any given matter than a more recent, longer,
and highly specific text.102  Informed by a suspicion of human nature,
it created an architecture of power designed to cause good to be done
even if the mal–intentioned occupied significant posts.103
The Germans, however, did not suspect or theorize about the
negative aspects of human nature when designing their country’s cur-
rent constitution.  Rather, they knew first–hand.  The German Basic
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
102. See Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, When A “Constitution” is a Constitution: Focus
on Peru, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 561, 606 (2001) (paraphrasing Giovanni Sartori “the af-
termath of World War II has seen a great increase in the length of constitutions.”).  See
GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING 199 (1994) (discussing
the Indian Constitution, with 395 articles, and the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, with 245 arti-
cles).
103. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
198 (1969) (quoting John Adams: “Liberty depends upon an exact Ballance (sic), a nice Coun-
terpoise of all the Powers of the state . . . .  The best Governments of the World have been
mixed”).  See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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Law (the “Grundgesetz”)104 was intended to raise Germany from the
ashes of war and genocide and ensure that nothing akin to the Holo-
caust would ever recur on its territory.  Not willing to place bets on
whether a structural safeguard would suffice, the German framers in-
stituted substantive prohibitions and protections that, on their face,
significantly diminish the chances of human rights infringements.
The Grundgesetz has 144 articles,105 19 of which are denominated
“Basic Rights.”  The especially relevant among these 144 articles are
as follows.  Article 102 abolishes capital punishment and Article 19(2)
states that in no case may the essence of a basic right be undermined
or qualified.  Also of special significance for human rights protections
is Germany’s status as a “fighting democracy” bestowed by Articles
21 and 79.  They state, respectively, that political parties seeking to
“impair or abolish the free democratic basic order” are unconstitu-
tional, as democracy cannot be used to install a totalitarian state, and
that the Grundgesetz cannot be amended so as to affect the “basic
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20.”106  These latter two articles
include the right to human dignity, Germany’s status as a “democratic
and social federal state,” the right to resist anyone who tries to abol-
ish the constitutional order, and the principle that “all state authority
emanates from the people.”107
Article 23, as amended in 1992, specifies that German participa-
tion in the development of the European Union (EU) is partially
premised on a state of affairs in which the EU “guarantees a level of
protection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that of [the]
Basic Law.”108  It further specifies that it is “to this end [that] the Fed-
eration may transfer sovereign powers.”109  This safeguarding of hu-
man rights standards against potential decreases pursuant to the dele-
gation of sovereignty could be seen many years earlier when the
German court determined its relationship with the European Court
of Justice.  In the Solange Zwei Case, the Court held that “[s]o long
as the . . . European Court . . . generally ensure[s] an effective protec-
tion of fundamental rights . . . that is to be regarded as substantially
similar to the protection of fundamental rights that the Basic Law re-
104. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.), translated in, DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 343 (Chi. Univ. Press 1994).
105. See GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 104.
106. Id. arts. 21 and 79.
107. Id. arts. 1 and 20.
108. Id. art. 23.
109. Id.
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quires, . . . the Federal Constitutional Court . . . will no longer meas-
ure [Community] law against the standard . . . contained in the Basic
Law.”110
A comparison of two nearly contemporaneous cases sheds light
on relevant differences between the U.S. Constitution and the
Grundgesetz, albeit as interpreted by the subjective lenses of each
lands’ highest court.  In the Life Imprisonment Case, 111 Germany’s
Constitutional Court held that a life sentence without the possibility
of parole is never permissible, regardless of the crime at issue.  The
Court confirmed that human dignity is the highest value of the Ger-
man constitutional order112 and announced that the duty to defend
human dignity hinges on the “conception of man as a spiritual–moral
being endowed with the freedom to determine and develop him-
self;”113  Given this freedom, any lifetime deprivation of liberty is
therefore disproportionate to the crime.  To explain why deterrence is
not a legitimate objective of the criminal law, the Court commentated
that, “It is contrary to human dignity to make persons the mere tools
of the state.”114  The Court accepted great responsibility in proclaim-
ing a duty not only to respect human dignity by not directly infringing
upon it, but also to ensure its realization through an affirmative obli-
gation to establish the necessary conditions conducive to the same.115
This decision contrasts sharply with several U.S. Supreme Court
cases concerning human dignity.  Human dignity is the underlying
value of the Eighth Amendment,116 and so Eighth Amendment cases
110. Solange Zwei, 73 BverfGE 387 (1986), quoted in CURRIE, supra note 104, at 96.  See
also the Maastricht Case, 89 BVerfGE 155 (1993), quoted in Kommers, infra note 111, at 112
(“The new Article 23 inserted into the Basic Law expressly mentions the [future] development
of the European Union and subjects it to the principles of democracy and the rule of law, the
principles of the social and federal state, and the principle of subsidiarity . . .  [I]t is expected
that a living democracy will be maintained in the member states as integration proceeds.”).
111. Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BverfGE 187 (1977), in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 306–13 (1997).
112. Id. at 316.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 313–20.  In a note to the case, Kommers explains that:
both court and commentators have characterized human dignity as an objective and
subjective right: objective in the sense of imposing an affirmative obligation upon the
state to establish conditions necessary for the realization of dignity; subjective in the
sense of barring the state from any direct interference with the negative freedom of in-
dividuals.
Id. at 321.
116. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . .  The Amendment must draw its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
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are in this sense the U.S. equivalent to the Life Imprisonment Case.
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the death penalty against an Eighth Amendment challenge.117
Thus, state–sponsored executions are not “cruel and unusual” within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, and government objectives
can legitimately require the destruction of a human person.  Human
dignity in the United States, therefore, is a forfeitable right, and con-
sequently, cannot logically be considered the core value of the U.S.
Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in the area of life imprison-
ment demonstrate the depth of the rift.  Just this month, in Ewing v.
California and Lockyer v. Andrade, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that neither a fifty-year sentence for stealing videotapes from K-Mart
nor a 25-year sentence without the possibility of parole for stealing
golf clubs violates the Eighth Amendment.118  The U.S. Constitution,
therefore, considers that human dignity is not impermissibly com-
promised by the practice of incarcerating people for the remainder of
their lives for stealing what amounts to half of the hourly fee of a suc-
cessful corporate attorney. 119  The level of protection flowing from the
Eighth Amendment proved to be quite malleable and quite low in
comparison to its German counterpart.
The rift between German and U.S. human dignity jurisprudence
may be derived from social mores to the extent that human judgment
is involved in eliciting the meaning of each constitution.  Social mores
do not originate in a vacuum, however.  Human dignity’s status as the
first article of the Grundgesetz creates an objective inference, under
117. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  Another significant aspect of this case is that it served to effec-
tively reinstate the death penalty after a ten-year period during which it was considered viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment.
118. Respectively, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (2003) and 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003).
119. The value of the video tapes stolen by Andrade was $153.54.  See Linda Greenhouse,
The Supreme Court: Repeat Offenders, Justices Uphold Long Sentences in Repeat Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A1.  It is apparent that those individuals who steal millions of dollars
and cause serious detriment to the entire national and international economy—such as those
involved in the Enron scandal—would, even under enhanced penalties, suffer merely a fraction
of the prison term imposed on the likes of Andrade and Ewing.  See Stiffer Penalties Ahead for
Corporate Criminals, US Gov/Info Resources, Jan. 16, 2003, available at http://usgovinfo.about.
com/library/weekly/aa011603a.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2003) (“As an example of the enhanced
penalties approved by the Commission, an officer of a publicly traded corporation who defrauds
more than 250 employees or investors of more than $1 million will receive a sentence of more
than 10 years in prison, almost double the term of imprisonment previously imposed.”).  While
this comparison is not technically relevant from a narrow legal perspective, it is illustrative of
the curious notions of proportionality that reign in U.S. law.
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standard precepts of statutory interpretation,120 that the Grundgesetz’s
remaining text is to be read and construed in accordance with human
dignity.  The circularity of norms and preferences hampers analysis of
this point, since Germany’s experience with the Holocaust led to the
adoption of a constitution beginning with the right to human dig-
nity.121
The United States, on the other hand, emerged triumphant from
a revolutionary war.  Protections of individual liberties were not the
first order of business; rather, they came in the form of amendments
to the Constitution.122  A different founding and constitutional struc-
ture has produced a different orientation to human rights guarantees.
It has also produced a different orientation to internationalism.
Although the United States and Germany have both succeeded
in protecting their own domestic human rights standards in the face of
pressure to cede power to international bodies, the substantive out-
come in each case was entirely different.  While Germany took steps
to ensure that its ceding of sovereignty pursuant to EU membership
would not reduce the level of protection for fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Grundgesetz, the United States sought to ensure
that its participation in human rights instruments would not increase
the level of protection that it must provide its own citizens.123  Two
very different notions of “prudence”124 emerge by way of this com-
parison.  These are consistent with the different notions of human
dignity elicited earlier; perhaps they are best viewed as the same phe-
nomenon.
Questions remain as to what degree U.S. normative structure has
caused the policy of conditional consent in the area of internation-
ally–inspired human rights.
120. See Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 31(1) and (2).  Although not necessarily
influential on the international plane, U.S. domestic principles are supportive of this point.  See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405
(1989).
121. There is of course a circular character to either argument, since certain social mores
preceding the Holocaust indicated that the Holocaust was indeed a tragedy of the greatest mag-
nitude.  And other human experiences and core documents embodying and propagating the les-
sons from that experience similarly predate the Holocaust.
122. See U.S. CONST. amends. 1–10.
123. Compare Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 37, at 3 with Grundge-
setz, supra note 104, art. 23, and the Solange Zwei case, supra note 110.  Regarding the first, see
also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
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B. Instrumentalist Theories
This second group of theories suggests that preferences matter,
perhaps more than norms.  By way of anecdotal illustration, the oft–
cited U.S. professional standard for legal representation of a client con-
tains two clauses and the order in which they occur is instructive: “to
[1] represent his client zealously [2] within the bounds of the law.”125
An alternative phrasing would require the attorney “to zealously ap-
ply the law within the bounds of the client’s interests.”  As a textual
matter, the actual version suggests that the lawyer concern his or her-
self first and foremost with satisfying certain interests.  The alterna-
tive version suggests that the lawyer be first and foremost an officer
of the court, have great concern for the integrity of the law, and en-
deavor to satisfy clients’ interests from that posture.  The following
theories indicate that the official version best describes the reality of
U.S. engagement with HRTs.
To illustrate the value of instrumentalist theories, it need only be
mentioned that the human rights question remains unresolved, de-
spite the relevant variables unearthed by the normative theories.  For
example, although the Grundgesetz requires Germany to provide a
substantive standard of human rights protections, the U.S. Constitu-
tion does not require the United States to provide a lower standard.
Rather, the United States chooses to do so of its own accord and
stretches the bounds of the law along the way.  An instrumentalist
theory would thus note that, despite the Senate’s considerable norma-
tive leeway to welcome international human rights protections, such
protections will be resisted to the extent that individuals such as Sena-
tors Bricker and Helms exercise influence.126  The “Vietnam flavor”127
of international agreements will, in turn, be resisted by individuals
such as Senator Stuart Symington.128  Instrumentalist theories center
on the reasons for this pattern.  To be useful, they must isolate key
variables that explain and, hence, predict the choices afforded by po-
litical discretion in the area of HRTs.
125. Model Code of Professional Responsibility 1983, EC 7-1, quoted in David B. Wilkins,
Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY
PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 70–75 (Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
126. See MARTIN, supra note 65, at 76.  Senator Bricker attempted to amend the Constitu-
tion to the effect that all treaties would become non-self-executing.  See Louis Henkin, US Rati-
fication of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 348
(1995).
127. This is meant to refer to international involvement at the other side of the spectrum
from involvement intended to increase human rights protection.
128. See MARTIN, supra note 65, at 77.
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1. HRTs threaten domestic sovereignty.  The fact that human
rights law deals largely with intra–national duties129 creates an
endemic obstacle to adherence and enforcement; it is perceived that
sovereignty is threatened, despite the fact that it is voluntarily
ceded.130  Judge Petren, opining in the Nuclear Tests Case on the
significance of the granting of individual rights by international law,
stated that “[i]n the relatively recent past . . . [e]ven the most
outrageous violations of human rights committed by a State toward
its own subjects could not have formed the subject of an application
by another State to an international judicial organ.”131  States
generally resist altering their behavior on their own turf at the behest
of other states and are reluctant to compromise their autonomy,
absent the potential for significant benefits.  The power to order and
determine one’s own affairs remains, at least in theory, an organizing
principle of the international system.  President George H.W. Bush
evidenced his understanding of this when, in order to convince the
U.S. Senate to ratify the ICCPR, he emphasized that U.S. practices
would not need to be altered and searched for ways to prevent this
internationally–created set of rights from being enforceable in
domestic courts.132
Professor Karl Kaiser theorizes that transnational relations nec-
essarily entail forms of decision–making antithetical to intra–state
control.133  In particular, transnational relations raise the specter of
“technocratic rule,” which undermines politics and, hence, democ-
racy.134  Kaiser describes three categories of decision–making, a stair-
129. This is to say that it regulates a state’s conduct with regard to its own citizens.
130. If the ability to retain domestic control of a given matter is given up through a volun-
tary ceding of power to international bodies, it cannot be maintained that sovereignty has been
diminished.  Rather, sovereignty implies the ability to make such a choice.  To maintain other-
wise would be to suggest that being forced into isolation would entail a greater quantity of sov-
ereignty than possessing the ability to choose between isolation and multinational integration.
The exception to this rule might lie in a situation where there was no way to regain a power
once it had been ceded.  These differing views of sovereignty are analogous to that coffee-house
conversation on how Americans define freedom in terms of individuality and self-reliance, while
Europeans define it in terms of connection to community.  Freedom must be the ability to
choose, not the substantive choice itself, since any ranking of outcomes presupposes subjective
values.
131. Australia v. France, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, 303 (Dec. 20).
132. John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Suprem-
acy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287 (1993).
133. Karl Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process, 25 INT’L
ORG. 706 (1971).
134. Id. at 708.
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way toward undemocratic rule: multibureaucratic decision–making,135
transnational politics,136 and multinational integration.137  He warns
that the forces undermining democratic control are themselves favor-
able,138 such as “interdependence, internationalism, economic ad-
vancement, scientific and technical progress,”139 and that those facili-
tating them believe themselves to be acting within “Western
democratic traditions.”140
Indeed, one of two basic assumptions is required to believe that
democracy is undermined by unconditional engagement with the
HRTs.  First, one may assume that such engagement would in fact
produce a democratic deficit.  Although HRTs engage elements of
both multibureaucratic decision-making and transnational politics, it
is unclear whether this implies undemocratic rule.  Kaiser’s theory
generates a tenable hypothesis: the U.S. policy of conditional consent,
qualifying HRTs so that they replicate domestic provisions, is de-
signed to allow the United States to avoid losing control of its domes-
tic policies regarding the treatment of its citizens.
The hypothetical test of this theory—that RUDs would not be is-
sued if democratic control could be maintained without them—is dif-
ficult to evaluate since the Senate’s perceptions may be skewed or, as
a body, it may be risk averse.  Normatively speaking, however, un-
conditional consent to HRTs would invite only mild transnational in-
fluence, since the Constitution would have to be amended to permit
any other source of law to supersede it.  Further, the last–in–time doc-
trine would not be affected.
HRTs have a relatively insignificant impact on state sovereignty.
This can be illustrated by elucidating the rough “gradations in sover-
eignty” visible on the international panorama.141  First, a nation may
135. As in NATO, where “the decisionmaking structures of different national governmental
and international bureaucracies intermesh within specific issue areas for the allocation of val-
ues.”  Id.
136. Such as that concerning currency exchange or movement of investment capital, con-
sisting of “political processes between national governments . . . set in motion by transnational
relations.”  Id. at 709.
137. In which States, as well as societal, and possibly intergovernmental, actors engage in
joint-decision-making on the “preparation, formulation, and implementation of political deci-
sions.”  Id. at 710.
138. This value judgment need not be addressed, except to clarify that his argument is con-
sistent with the phrase, “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”
139. Id. at 715.
140. Id. at 706.
141. See Robert O. Keohane, Political authority after intervention: gradations in sovereignty,
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 275 (J.L.
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remain free from international obligation altogether.  Second, sover-
eignty may be ceded in agreements whereby an international body in-
terprets the terms of the treaty and recommends courses of action—
as illustrated by the treaty bodies, such as the HRC.  Third, the right
to interpret the law may be ceded to supranational courts that impose
courses of action.  This was the experience of Switzerland in the Be-
lilos case before the European Court of Human Rights.142  Fourth,
outside law is given direct effect superior to domestic law, causing
automatic changes therein.  EU law as applied to Member States pro-
vides an example of this category.  Fifth, and finally, U.N.–based sov-
ereignty can exist temporarily, as in the humanitarian intervention in
Kosovo.143
Although the HRC is empowered to interpret the ICCPR, the
last–in–time doctrine would permit Congress to annul undesirable in-
terpretations and the inherent weakness of the HRT regime would
generate insignificant repercussions.  The HRT regime, as superim-
posed on the U.S. domestic legal structure, would fall within the sec-
ond gradation, showing its relative insignificance for domestic sover-
eignty.
Those who maintain that sovereignty or democratic control is
threatened by HRTs may also assume a stable relationship between
transnational decision–making and a loss in local control.  An absence
of transnational decision–making on an issue of global scale may also
cause such a loss.  As such, their argument omits a relevant variable—
the scale of the phenomenon being regulated.  Transnational regula-
tion of a global issue can cause an increase in local control, since
without international coordination, the efforts of any one country
could be futile.  This is true, for example, where a country attempts to
prevent polluted air from crossing its borders or attempts to forestall
global warming.  Although coordinated international decision–mak-
ing could be seen as producing a democratic deficit because the coun-
try ceases to be solely accountable to its domestic constituency, this
coordination actually causes a democratic surplus, since the affected
state becomes empowered to control its fate.  Thus, although the
states participating in the transnational decisional processes might,
for example, have to mandate lower automobile emissions, raise the
Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).
142. The European Court of Human Rights struck down a reservation made by Switzerland
and proceeded to apply the entire treaty to them, instead of exempting them from the improp-
erly reserved-to article.  See Belilos v. Switzerland, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 466 (1988).
143. See Keohane, supra note 141, at 282–90.
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price of gasoline, or impose tougher standards on factories, they
might also gain the ability to prevent their coastal land from becom-
ing an underwater attraction or their farmers from losing the ability
to grow certain crops.
So too with human rights protections, insofar as human rights
abuses causally correlate with regional instability and frustrate devel-
opment—economic or otherwise.  Countries willing to tolerate minor
reductions in their ability to abuse their own citizens may achieve an
enhanced ability to accomplish other ends.  By incorporating external
inputs into domestic law, thereby providing a point of insertion for in-
ternational influence into domestic decision-making, the ‘collective
action problem’ of human rights protection can be addressed.144
This notion of trade–offs between different types of sovereignty
forces a redefinition of sovereignty, which, in turn, may require that
decision–makers reconsider their preferences.  Sovereignty encom-
passes more than the ability to exercise authority over one’s territory.
Professor Steven D. Krasner observes three other types of sover-
eignty, besides “domestic sovereignty,” as defined in the previous
sentence.  These include “international legal sovereignty[, defined as]
the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between ter-
ritorial entities,” “Westphalian sovereignty[, defined as] political or-
ganization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority
structures within a given territory,” and “interdependence sover-
eignty[, defined as] the ability of public authorities to regulate the
flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across
the borders of their state.”145
The observation that “sovereignty” refers to the capabilities of a
state in various issue areas leads to the conclusion that it is, in the
words of Professor Sohn, “divisible, up or down.”146  If state A pos-
sesses a high ability to organize its authority within its territory, but a
low ability to achieve recognition by other states in the international
forum, some of that former ability could be used to achieve an in-
crease in the latter ability.  This could be accomplished, for example,
by agreeing to international input on human rights issues in exchange
for being included in transnational decisional fora—i.e., councils,
144. This analysis is developed more fully in sub-part C, infra.
145. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3–4 (1999).
146. On the divisibility of sovereignty, see International Law in a World of Multiple Actors:
Conversation with Professors Louis Henkin & Louis Sohn, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 248,
254 (1998).
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conventions, regional bodies, and the like.147  Phrased differently, 100
units of sovereignty, allocated formerly to domestic sovereignty only,
could be divided between that form of sovereignty, as well as interna-
tional legal sovereignty.  Alternatively, it could be divided among
even more issue areas.  Reductions in one area may accomplish in-
creases in another.148
The concept of divisible sovereignty may be difficult for those
who still conceive of sovereignty in the original context of rulers
whose power emanated from divine origin; however, it need not be
so.  Even if “there is and must be . . . a supreme, irresistible, absolute,
uncontrolled authority, in which the jura sumi imperii, or the rights of
sovereignty reside,”149 that authority would necessarily possess the
ability to lease part of its omnipotent reign to achieve desirable ends.
Otherwise, it would not be supreme or absolute.  Indeed, it is sover-
eignty that permits the United States to make international agree-
ments in the first place.150
Absent confusion on the part of the Senate or the president re-
garding the divisibility of sovereignty or the minimal intrusion on
sovereignty inflicted by HRTs, it might be assumed that the decision
to tender conditional consent to HRTs was made to avoid the crea-
tion of additional human rights within the United States, not to avoid
transnational decision–making.  Moreover, the afterthought that the
maintenance of domestic decisional autonomy is a consistent aspect
of U.S. practice, and hence that the decision not to enhance domestic
human rights protections was made in order to avoid undemocratic
enactment of laws, is hardly worth discussion.  The treaty power is
exercised quite frequently, and the democratically inferior, court–cre-
147. Turkey, for example, has been pressured to improve its human rights record and abol-
ish the death penalty in order to gain entry to the EU.  See, e.g., No date for Turkey EU entry
talks, CNN.COM, Oct. 9, 2002, at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/09/
eu.enlargement.turkey/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2003) (“Turkey’s human rights record has led to
the postponement of talks on its entry into the European Union.”); Suzan Fraser, Turkey Abol-
ishes Death Penalty, Associated Press, Aug. 3, 2002, available at http://www.kurdishlibrary.
org/Kurdish_Library/Aktuel/Turkey_EU/AP_News_020803_Eng.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2003) (“Turkey’s parliament abolished the death penalty and granted more rights to minority
Kurds Saturday, taking a major step forward in its bid to join the European Union.”); Case of
Öcalan v. Turkey, Application no. 46221/99, ECHR, Mar. 12, 2003 (illustrating the practical ef-
fects of such change).
148. To provide another example, the ceding of the power to determine tariffs on goods en-
tering a state can result in a contemporaneous increase in power to influence the tariffs set by
other states in their territories, as in the world trade scheme.
149. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *49.
150. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 302, cmt. a (“The authority of the United States to
make international agreements is inherent in its nationhood and sovereignty”).
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ated executive agreement, which does not require the Senate’s con-
sent, is utilized even more often.151  Furthermore, several treaties rati-
fied by the United States are at least, if not more, abhorrent to local
control, such as the GATT and the WTO agreement, in that they em-
power a foreign panel of experts to issue binding decisions upon all
member countries.  Inconsistent practice by the United States on the
issue of resisting foreign influence,152 and two–sided practice in the
same area weakens the argument that a simple aversion to transna-
tional influence causes U.S. conditional consent to HRTs.153  It must
be specified who is averse to transnational influence and how deci-
sions are made about whether to allow that influence.
These questions are answered by looking to an additional variety
of sovereignty—intra-national sovereignty, referred to in the United
States as “states’ rights.”  In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court
established that treaties can intrude into areas otherwise reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment.154  The use of the treaty power to
regulate such areas may be seen as “federal aggrandizement and
diminution of state authority.”155  A facet of the larger issue of domes-
tic politics, this issue is easily overlooked by theoretical inquiries
partly because of “the use of game theory, with its assumption of uni-
tary, rational actors.”156  The United States is not a unitary actor,
given its fifty semi–sovereign component parts.  Professor Helen Mil-
ner asserts that domestic politics controls domestic ratification in the
sense that it “tells us how preferences are aggregated and national in-
151. See MARGOLIS, supra note 77; JOHNSON, supra note 77.
152. Compare the United States approach to HRTs with its role in the WTO.
153. Compare rejection of the International Criminal Court to simultaneous prosecution of
foreign nationals under the Alien Torts Claims Act.  See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”); Paul
Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.R. 311, 360 (2002) (“[O]ver the
past two decades, aliens have begun to bring human rights suits in the United States against for-
eign and U.S. governments and officials under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).  Although
the jurisdictional reach of this Act is governed by the same due process/minimum contacts limi-
tations as all other suits, the Act does grant federal courts original subject matter jurisdiction
over ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.’”).
154. Holland, 252 U.S. at 416.  See Henkin, supra note 74, at 190.  The Holland holding, if
respected, would greatly facilitate compliance with article 27 of the Vienna Convention, supra
note 30 (“a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to
perform a treaty”).
155. Henkin, supra note 74, at 190.
156. Helen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and
Weaknesses, 44 WORLD POL. 466, 489 (1992).
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terests are constructed [and] can help explain the strategies states
adopt to realize their goals.”157
The dialogue between the president and the Senate, which leads
to a decision on whether to consent, consent only conditionally, sign
but not ratify, negotiate but not sign, withhold all forms of participa-
tion, or to offer one of the various possible levels of opposition, must
necessarily be shaped by domestic political concerns.  The task is to
isolate and deconstruct the concerns that have been sufficiently poli-
ticized so as to influence the dialogue.  With regard to HRTs, states’
rights concerns have culminated in a decision to take the second path
outlined above and a federalism RUD was issued for the ICCPR.  It
makes clear that the ICCPR “shall be implemented by the Federal
Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial ju-
risdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state
and local governments.”158  This RUD proves that states’ rights con-
cerns have contributed to the policy of conditional consent.
Although not a states’ rights case per se, Ewing v. California,159
the most recent case from the Supreme Court on the Eighth Amend-
ment, illustrates the strength of states’ rights in U.S. law.  In Ewing,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasized that the Supreme Court
“do[es] not sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to second–guess [states’] policy
choices,”160 supporting the general principle that “[s]tates possess pri-
mary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.”161  Al-
though obvious from a normative constitutional perspective, it is
worth noting that not even the dictates of the Bill of Rights and the
authority of the Supreme Court receive “unconditional consent”
within the U.S. system.  Legal doctrines of intra–national domestic
sovereignty constrain their actions.  HRTs must contend with these
same hurdles, even when they survive the challenges of national do-
mestic sovereignty at step one.
Further evidence of the strength of this intra–national domestic
sovereignty can be seen in the practice of executing foreign nationals
in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.162  Fur-
157. Id. at 493.
158. See the fifth U.S. understanding to the ICCPR, supra note 7.
159. Ewing, 123 S.Ct. at 1179.
160. Id. at 1189.
161. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982), reaff’d in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
561 n.3 (1995).
162. The International Court of Justice has ruled against the United States for thwarting this
treaty and the United States has apologized for its violations of the consular rights of other
states’ nationals.  See, e.g., Press Release, International Court of Justice, LaGrand Case
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thermore, states’ rights interests appear to be eroding the contours of
Missouri v. Holland.163  States’ rights pose a formidable obstacle to
unconditional consent to HRTs.  It may be that maintenance of com-
plete domestic sovereignty, although ill-defined and not a consistent
aspect of U.S. practice, is valued more highly than the benefits of un-
conditional HRT adhesion.164  The benefits of this adhesion occupy a
central place in theories emphasizing the role of reciprocity in treaty
membership and adherance.
2. Absence of reciprocity.  An examination of reciprocity
benefits suggests that HRTs receive only conditional consent because
they provide only a limited incentive to do anything more.  Professor
Robert Keohane, noting that international cooperation does not
depend on deference to hierarchical authority nor centralized
enforcement, suggests that reciprocity may help explain cooperation.
Quoting Professor Alvin Gouldner, Keohane states that reciprocity
implies “actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from
others and that cease when these expected reactions are not
forthcoming.”165  If human rights norms are less likely than other
international norms to derive strength from expectations of
reciprocity, a concomitant weakness in participation in HRTs would
be expected.
Human rights norms are indeed less likely than other interna-
tional norms to derive strength from expectations of reciprocity.  The
former create rights that vest in individuals, while the latter create
rights that vest in states.  General skepticism about whether interna-
tional law is “really law” exists largely because of the lack of a judicial
system with compulsory jurisdiction to settle disputes, also described
(Germany v. United States), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2001/
ipresscom2001-16bis_20010627.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2003) (finding “by fourteen votes to one
that, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay following their arrest of their
rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and
by thereby depriving Germany of the possibility, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance
provided for by the Convention to the individuals concerned, the United States breached its
obligations to Germany and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the
Convention” and noting that “[t]he United States has presented an apology to Germany for this
breach.”).
163. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390 (1998) (discussing the changing status of the treaty power).
164. Or, conversely, the perceived consequences of conditional consent may be insuffi-
ciently severe to outweigh the perceived costs of international influence.
165. Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 1, 5–6 (1986).
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as the condition of international anarchy.166  This skepticism can be
countered by reference to the reciprocity of advantage derived from
collective adherence to international law. For example, if State A im-
poses certain tariffs on goods from State B in violation of a treaty,
State B can respond in kind, vindicating its interests, and providing
compliance incentives to State A.  Yet, if State A tortures its citizens
in violation of a treaty, other States Parties to the treaty will obvi-
ously not be able to bring State A back into compliance by torturing
their own citizens; nor can they vindicate their interests in this way.
The lack of a judicial system with compulsory jurisdiction represents a
heightened problem for HRTs, since the principle of reciprocity of
obligations is at its weakest.  The absence of reciprocity results in me-
diocre adherence at best.167  WTO compliance generally supports this
claim, evidencing high compliance in a situation of high reciprocity.168
Another type of reciprocity, known as “diffuse reciprocity,”
emanates not from specific “tit–for–tat” effects, but from a “wide-
spread sense of obligation” to contribute to the production of a public
good.169  Situations of diffuse reciprocity produce incentives to “free
ride,” in the sense that “a vague sense of global public interests” is of-
ten insufficient to motivate good behavior.170  The codification of hu-
man rights norms into treaties that parties give their word to uphold
represents an attempt to resolve the collective action problem thus
described.  HRTs typically generate only diffuse reciprocity,171 which
provides limited incentives for compliance or full adhesion, especially
to strong states.
3. Power facilitates relative immunity from international
scrutiny.  Absent a detailed analysis of domestic politics and
individual utility functions, it is unclear why certain preferences win
166. See WALTZ, infra note 179.
167. Still, perceptions that no reciprocity can be derived from HRTs reflect a narrow view of
self-interest, which ignores the emerging consensus that, as suggested above, respecting human
rights fosters public goods, such as stability, the prevention of international conflict, and the
ability to participate in markets.  Assuming, arguendo, that this is so, failing to uphold human
rights constitutes free-ridership.
168. Keohane, supra note 165, at 15-9.
169. Id. at 19–20.
170. Id.
171. This statement is logically true unless the receipt of certain benefits or the continuation
of certain privileges (or the cessation of certain detriments) is conditioned upon adherence to
HRTs.  For the transition from diffuse to specific reciprocity to occur, linkages would have to be
made between the maintenance of the HRT regime in the United States and the receipt of some
immediate benefit or detriment.
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out over others, yet it seems plausible that states with greater military,
economic, and technological power and, hence greater self–
sufficiency, would be less likely to be affected in preference–altering
ways by institutions and other states.172  Peterson summarizes that the
“United States is, in some respects, the last place one would look for
international constraints on the making of foreign policy.”173
Unfortunately, it is difficult to test hypotheses along these lines.
HRTs emerged after World War II, and the United States did not
need to expend any energy to gain relative superiority over the Sovi-
ets in the area of human rights protection, except perhaps to down-
grade the importance of the socialist style socio–economic rights.174
Similarly, nuclear powers such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and India
are not difficult to outshine, with the notable exception of executing
minors.  This theory rests on sound factual ground in that the United
States had a primordial role in hatching the United Nations and con-
tinues to be its prime sponsor.  It has secured a permanent role on the
Security Council and enjoys a sort of ‘home court advantage’ in any
debates on the topic of U.S. exceptionalism.  In addition, the United
States has given signs that it is willing to use its disproportionate in-
fluence to blackmail the HRC into reversing its position on U.S.
RUDs.175  Power has insulated the United States from criticism and
evolving international standards of decency.  Still, according to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the United States was moti-
vated by reputational interests to participate in the ICCPR: “The
Committee believes that ratification will remove doubts about the se-
riousness of the U.S. commitment to human rights and strengthen the
172. See Peterson, supra note 76, at 217–18.
173. Id. at 217.  See also Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and
Strategies of Legal Change, J. POL. PHIL. (forthcoming 2003) (on file with the author) (“[T]he
United States is engaged in a sophisticated effort to secure generally applicable legal changes
that, while in principle available to all, will in practice be of use only to the most powerful of
countries . . . .  If successful, this attempt would create greater ambiguity in the law on the use of
force, thus allowing more space for the application of power and influence in determining when
and where it is legal to intervene.  In practical terms, the result would be a virtually unlimited
discretion for the United States to engage in military action under international law, but rela-
tively little if any change in the limited scope of discretion available to other, less-powerful
states.”).  Byers identifies what is likely a general reality of power just as applicable to HRT
RUDs as to the use of force.
174. See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 4 (Univ. Fla. Press 1988).
175. See Redgwell, supra note 35, at 414 (discussing congressional passage of a bill to “cut
off funding for U.S. obligations under the ICCPR unless the Human Rights Committee ‘ex-
pressly recognised the validity [of the U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations] as a
matter of international law,’” later vetoed by President Clinton).
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impact of U.S. efforts in the human rights field.”176
Why a critical mass of U.S. citizens have not joined the “epis-
temic”177 human rights community and pressured their government to
adopt all HRT norms is a question beyond the scope of this article.
U.S. citizens, given their political rights, could pressure their govern-
ment if they so desired.  However, institutions’ preference–altering
effects are easiest to resist when the effects themselves are weak.  In
either case, the power differential between the resisting state and the
relevant institutional framework is a relevant variable.  History does
seem to show that “the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy
depends mainly on considerations of power and policy and only tan-
gentially on law.”178  Still, the strong legal norms embodied in the con-
tract theory of treaties and separation of powers would simultane-
ously seem to indicate that policies regarding HRTs are also the
result of accepted norms.
C. A Socio–Structural Theory of Human Rights Protection
Regardless of whether human rights protections are subjected to
conditional consent because of a respect for norms or because of self-
interest, the result is the same.  This theory discounts the distinction
between rules and interests, focusing instead on objective features of
the international environment.  It draws upon concepts from property
law and economics, and assumes an environment of competition be-
tween states, and a popular belief that infringing human rights in par-
ticular instances can be beneficial to national security.  It predicts that
human rights cannot be reliably and consistently protected within the
United States, unless definitive social arrangements are erected to es-
tablish a substantive floor beyond which the state cannot pass without
formally rescinding the law.
Anarchy may be the most important structural condition in-
forming whether individuals are meaningfully entitled to human
rights.  If states did not fear each other, national security would not
be of such fundamental import and would likely not trump human
rights.  Professor Kenneth Waltz posits that a Hobbesian state of na-
ture presides over the international system: “[b]ecause any state may
at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to
176. See Senate committeee on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Doc. No. 102-23, at 3 (2d Sess. 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
645.
177. For a discussion of epistemic communities, see Milner, supra note 156, at 479.
178. FORSYTHE, supra note 174, at ix.
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counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness.”179  The lack
of an authoritative neutral arbitrator of disputes with overwhelming
enforcement powers distinguishes international issues from their do-
mestic counterparts.  The effects of this condition for HRTs can be
played out through conducting an analysis that borrows heavily from
property law.
International anarchy provides a disincentive for states to award
their citizens an entitlement to be free from human rights abuse.  If
individuals were entitled to their human rights, the government would
have to bargain with them prior to violating their rights in order to
purchase those rights, pay court-determined damages after violating
those rights, or be restricted altogether from violating those rights,
even if the individuals wished to sell or cede their entitlement.  These
three types of rules protecting entitlements are referred to, respec-
tively, as a property rule, liability rule, and inalienability rule.180  The
first two types as applied to human rights would impose a cost on
governments for violating any given individual’s entitlement to be
free from human rights abuse.  The last type would make it illegal for
a government to acquire that entitlement under any circumstance.  As
such, each of these three rules would restrict the government’s action,
and, specifically with regard to anarchy, would prevent states from
countering threats to national security by exercising increased control
over their citizens.
A property rule for human rights is ruled out to the extent that
individual rights are codified and non-transferable.181  Rather, domes-
tic human rights can be subject to a liability rule, insofar as the gov-
ernment “may destroy the initial entitlement if [it] is willing to pay an
objectively determined value for it.”182  That price is the detriment to
179. KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR 160 (3d ed. 2001).  North Korea’s
response to the current U.S. war against Iraq is illustrative of this phenomenon.  See Howard W.
French, North Korea Says its Arms Will Deter U.S. Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at B13 (“In
its strongest reaction yet to the war in Iraq, North Korea said today that only by arming itself
with a ‘tremendous military deterrent’ could the country guarantee its security.”).
180. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090–1105 (1972).
181. See, respectively, the Bill of Rights, supra note 12, and the illegality doctrine of contract
law as described in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 192 (1981) (“A promise to commit a
tort to induce the commission of a tort is unenforceable on grounds of public policy”) and as
summarized by Juliet P. Kostritsky: “The doctrine of illegal contracts, which allows parties to
avoid their obligations when a contract is ‘illegal’ or against public policy, is a rare limitation on
freedom of contract.”  Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract
Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116–17 (1988).
182. In its original context, this quote does not refer to human rights, but rather to a type of
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public confidence and support that could result from the destruction
of the entitlement, and, potentially, the cost of going to court.  Since
the government will not necessarily compensate victims of human
rights abuse, such a rule is best described as a partial liability rule.
Although individuals in the United States are entitled to certain
rights, most notably those contained in the Amendments to the Con-
stitution, the meaning of many of those rights is highly variable.  This
much is evident from a comparison of the entitlement to not be en-
slaved with the entitlement to due process.183  Despite the convict ca-
veat, the first is a clear inalienability rule: “Neither Slavery nor invol-
untary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States.”184
Therefore, a person in the United States cannot be subjected to “a
situation in which one person has absolute power over the[ir] life, for-
tune, and liberty,”185 nor can they make a legally valid offer so as to
submit themselves to such a situation.186  However, the Due Process
Clause, even in the words of those who know it best, is “cryptic and
abstract”187 in wording, and, in application, “a delicate process of ad-
justment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those
whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.”188
Since the due process clause “cannot be imprisoned within the
treacherous limits of any formula,”189 it provides essentially no stan-
dard of protection other than what the court decides.190  Therefore,
rule governing the ownership of property.  See CALABRESI & MELAMED, supra note 180, at
1092 (“Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objec-
tively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”).
183. See U.S. CONST. amends. 5 and 13.
184. Id. amend. 13.  The “convict caveat” refers to the exception to the prohibition made for
people being punished for a crime whereof they have been duly convicted.  Id.  Additional inal-
ienability rules can be seen domestically in areas such as the sale of body parts and endangered
species.  See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 935 (1985) (“Modified inalienability rules appear in such diverse contexts
as the transplantation of body parts, the adoption of babies, and the preservation of endangered
species.  The converse of a modified inalienability rule is modified property.  Under this rule,
gifts are forbidden but sales at ‘fair’ market prices are permitted.”).  The Grundgesetz’s aboli-
tion of the death penalty constitutes a foreign example of an inalienability rule.  See
GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 104, art. 102.
185. Black’s Law Dictionary 1393 (7th ed. 1999).
186. See illegality doctrine, supra note 181.
187. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
188. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160 (1951).
189. Id.
190. Although the Supreme Court has noted that “there can be no doubt that at a minimum
[the words of the Due Process Clause] require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceeded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case,” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313, the nature of the hearing required is left open.  Conse-
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individuals within the United States are inalienably entitled to what-
ever due process the Supreme Court gives them.  If the Thirteenth
Amendment did not on its face prohibit slavery, but “exploitative
practices” instead, the right to be free from slavery would not be in-
alienable.  Even if this had been interpreted to prohibit slavery, that
interpretation could change within the course of one lawsuit.
This analysis does not suggest anything short of “stout confi-
dence in the strength of the democratic faith,”191 but does posit that
democratic will can erode human rights standards.  Fareed Zakaria
notes that “[d]emocratically elected regimes, often ones that have
been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignor-
ing constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of
basic rights and freedoms.”192  The implication is that constitutional
liberalism, as defined by “the rule of law, a separation of powers, and
the protection of basic liberties,” and democracy, consisting of “free
and fair elections,” are independent variables.193  Given that democ-
racy is an insufficiently disaggregated concept, not by itself guaran-
teeing a consistent respect for freedom and human dignity, the incen-
tives and safeguards for human rights protections become essential.
Human rights in a democracy are minority rights, in the sense
that it will never be politically popular to subject the majority to hu-
man-rights-abusive measures, and, even if it were, it would not raise
the troubling issues of tyranny or oppression as described by
Tocqueville and Madison.194  The Japanese internment at issue in Ko-
rematsu v. United States195 would have been impossible if the United
States was primarily composed of people of Japanese ancestry.  To
emphasize that human rights in a democracy are minority rights, al-
though tautological, is to prove that a democratic government can
abuse those rights whenever it is politically popular to do so.  This is
logically true, unless either existing procedural and substantive safe-
quently, there is no guarantee that any meaningful level of process will be achieved.  This con-
cern over erosion of textually vague standards is heightened with regard to the 8th Amendment
right to not be subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment.”  See supra notes 118 and 163–164
and corresponding text.
191. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 160.
192. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 22 (1997).
193. Id.
194. See id. at 30 (quoting James Madison: “Madison explained in the Federalist that ‘the
danger of oppression’ in a democracy came from the ‘majority of the community,’” and Alexis
de Tocqueville: “Tocqueville warned of the ‘tyranny of the majority,’ writing, ‘The very essence
of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority.’”).
195. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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guards can impose costs on such abuse sufficient to outweigh the
benefits derived from the abuse, or that human nature is such that it
would never be politically popular to restrict freedom under any cir-
cumstance.
An inalienable entitlement to a changing level of protection cre-
ates a sense of justice within the populace, while imposing no firm re-
straint on how the government can achieve its goals.  Domestically,
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation are among the most obvi-
ous goals behind human rights infringements.196  In the international
sphere, these goals are subsumed within the overarching national se-
curity prerogative.
Garrett Hardin maintains that, assuming no ownership rights or
management duties, open access to a resource plus a demand for that
resource will yield overuse.197  The fewer the constraints on states, the
more they would be tempted to impinge on their citizens’ rights, as a
simple matter of cost–benefit analysis.  It is indeed a paradoxical ex-
ample of the tragedy of the commons where those who injure their
own citizens can be considered “free riders.”  Recall the analysis of
reciprocity above.198  In the trade regime, a state benefits from mem-
bership in the WTO and becomes a free rider to the extent it can re-
ceive favorable treatment by countries adhering to the treaty’s terms
while simultaneously denying that same treatment to other States
Parties, assuming it can do so undetected or unpunished.  In the hu-
man rights regime, however, a state becomes a free rider to the extent
it can receive benefits, likely in the form of political and reputational
capital, from membership in the HRT regime, while simultaneously
denying the rights its own citizens are due per the treaties’ terms.
In part, this dynamic is made possible through scale: the presence
of non-unitary actors with discrete components, such as the nation-
state.  Such actors can transgress upon the commons within their own
borders to secure goods contributing only to indivisible particularized
utility, while insisting that the commons outside of their national ter-
196. See RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03 (1989) (including deterrence,
retribution, and incapacitation as primary justifications for punishment).
197. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), at
http://www.constitution.org/cmt/tragcomm.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2003) (“[T]he rational
herdsman conclude that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to
his herd . . .  But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a
commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a system that compels him to in-
crease his herd without limit . . . .  Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”).
198. See Part IIB2, supra.
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ritory be respected.  States transgress upon the rights of their own
citizens, while advocating for international human rights, because it is
rational to do so.199
A liability rule allows for overuse of human rights.  Overuse, in
turn, results in externalities such as over-depletion and under-
investment.  Just as private property was the solution, individual
rights also served to allocate the entitlement to those possessing such
rights.  Those who violated them would be forced to pay.  The cost of
internalizing externalities was a function of the cost of setting up a
monitoring regime with enforcement powers.  This is one way to de-
scribe the emergence of the U.N. human rights apparatus.  In both
U.S. property law and international human rights practice, however,
the state can exercise a takings without compensation when it per-
ceives a sufficient need, such as the need for increased national secu-
rity.
A true inalienability rule would require an authority above the
United States that could not be co-opted nor superseded.  The inter-
national system as it stands is akin to the ‘wild west.’  When states
abuse the human rights of their own citizens, they act as outlaws who
estimate, often correctly, that the sheriff (here, the United Nations or
another international body) can be beaten in a gunfight or may sim-
ply lack the ability to catch them in the act.200  Absent a significant
change to the international order, a scaled-down version of an inal-
ienability rule would have to be set domestically in order for human
rights to be meaningfully guaranteed.  This could occur in the form of
a constitutional amendment that elaborated in detail and on its face
the rights to be preserved and the impermissibility of qualifying them.
Inalienability could be further facilitated, albeit less securely,201 by
congressional statutes or treaties specifying clear rights and an indi-
vidual cause of action.  HRTs could provide one such avenue.202
199. Consider the election cycle, for example.  If George W. Bush “gets tough on terror,” he
can count on receiving the votes of those who are more outraged by terrorism than by a gov-
ernment that would transgress on individual human rights.  He estimates that any reputational
or diplomatic detriment to him as a result will be inferior to the amount of utility he derives
from the disapproved-of actions.  It would in a strict sense be irrational for him to be moved by
the detriment to either disempowered sectors of society—such as immigrants, minorities, and
the poor—or the U.S.’ long-term interests.
200. Still, even if the U.N. did possess superior force, the question “quis custodiet ipsos cus-
todes?” remains.  Who should guard the guardian?
201. This simply refers to the ease with which an act of congress, as compared to a constitu-
tional amendment, can be passed.
202. See Part IIIB, infra.
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Although the complexity of the international system naturally in-
creases transaction costs, it is its anarchic character that most compli-
cates and most requires efforts to make human rights less alienable203
through the HRT regime.  In conditions of anarchy, where no inter-
national body with enforcement powers exists, even if states agree to
an inalienability rule, they are not bound to their word.  The struggle
for relative and absolute advantage, as well as limited trust, and fierce
competition inherent in anarchy go a long way in explaining why sub-
stantive human rights protections are trumped by national security.  It
is mostly because states are competing with each other that they rely
on the logic that a relatively unhindered ability to detain, try in secret,
and generally control those on their territory allows for greater flexi-
bility in countering internal or external threats to security.
The theory is presumptively that “[i]t is not mathematically pos-
sible to maximize for two (or more) variables at the same time.”204
The implicit logic in this is that human rights and national security are
either independent variables or negatively correlated—that is that
they are either unrelated or that greater human rights begets greater
insecurity.  As long as this is assumed, a liability rule for human rights
is nothing more than an appeal to the government’s good conscience:
i.e., “You shouldn’t violate human rights, because we believe that
violating human rights is immoral; and by so doing, you’ll have to
stretch the law and your conscience.”
Hardin, discussing the problem of a burgeoning world popula-
tion, turns to Darwinian logic to explain why conscience is self-
eliminating:
People vary.  Confronted with appeals to limit breeding, some peo-
ple will undoubtedly respond to the plea more than others.  Those
who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next
generation than those with more susceptible consciences.  The dif-
ferences will be accentuated, generation by generation.205
As applied to human–rights appeals to governments’ consciences, the
quote would read:
203. I would say “inalienable,” but conditions for derogation are specified in the HRT re-
gime and in treaty law generally.  Still, certain norms are described as “non-derogable” or jus
cogens—that is, a peremptory norm from which no nation may stray if it is to comply with cus-
tomary international law.  Such norms include the prohibition on torture, genocide, and pacta
sunt servanda.  See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1997); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, adopted
Dec. 10, 1948; ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 2–4, 7; Theodore Meron, International Criminalization
of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 568–71 (1995).
204. See Hardin, supra note 197 n.3 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 1247.
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States vary.  Confronted with appeals to respect human rights,
some states will respond more than others.  Those that violate those
rights when it benefits them will obtain a larger quantity of control
and dominance than those with more susceptible consciences.  The
differences will be accentuated, generation by generation.
To solve this collective action problem, Hardin proposes “mutual
coercion mutually agreed upon.”206  If responsibility cannot be reliably
created through appeals to the conscience, then one must look to
definite social arrangements.  Hardin writes that “[t]he social ar-
rangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create
coercion, of some sort” and observes that in the case of bank robbery
society does not appeal to robbers’ consciences, begging them to
cease treating banks as a commons.207  “Rather . . . we seek the defi-
nite social arrangements that will keep it from becoming a com-
mons.”208  Coercion need not decrease freedom, even governmental
freedom.  “When men mutually agreed to pass laws against robbing,
mankind becomes more free, not less so.  Individuals [or govern-
ments] locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on
universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, they
become free to pursue other goals. . . .  ‘Freedom is the recognition of
necessity’.”209
Can an inalienability rule, or any form of coercion securing the
protection of human rights, be mutually agreed upon?  Beryl Crowe
surmises that “[t]he factor that sustained the myth of coercive force in
the past was the acceptance of a common value system.  Whether the
latter exists is questionable in the modern nation–state.”210  More cen-
trally, why would the majority voluntarily grant the minority an inal-
ienable entitlement to be free from incursions upon human rights?
Calabresi and Malamed write that “external costs may justify inal-
ienability . . . when external costs do not lend themselves to collective
measurement which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary.”211
They suggest that although some costs can be called moralisms, there
are other types of external costs that similarly defy quantification, and
proceed to describe self-paternalism as an efficiency reason in favor
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1248.
210. Beryl Crowe, The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited (1969), reprinted in GARRET
HARDIN & JOHN BADEN, MANAGING THE COMMONS 59–60 (1977), available at
http://dieoff.com/page95.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
211. CALABRESI & MELAMED, supra note 180, at 1111–12.
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of inalienability.212  Self paternalism describes those situations where
individuals take action to prevent themselves from “yielding to . . .
temptations which they deem harmful to themselves.”213
This choice is efficient, because it “allows the individual to
choose what is best in the long run rather than in the short run.”214
Acting in accordance with human rights principles lends the necessary
credibility and prestige for engagement in and positive influence on
international comity.215
In summary, in an environment of competition between states
and in the absence of an authoritative body to coerce states into up-
holding a given level of human rights protection, states will often re-
sort to human-rights infringing measures.  This hypothesis identifies
and accounts for the assumptions that fuel the choice to infringe these
rights, most notably, the assumption that national security and human
rights are juxtaposed, or negatively correlated.  It posits that certain
social arrangements are necessary in order for domestic human rights
to be reliably and consistently preserved, and, hence, that the con-
cerns underlying the human rights question can only be addressed
through a scaled down inalienability rule.  The contents of one set of
social arrangements that could implement such a rule are suggested
below, after existing proposals for reforming the U.S. policy of condi-
tional consent are briefly examined.
III.  PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THE CONTROVERSIES
Thus far, this Article has explained the domestic and interna-
tional law pertaining to HRTs, reviewed hypotheses as to why the
United States has consented only conditionally to the same, and pro-
posed that the negative incentives inherent in international anarchy
can be countered through social arrangements that decrease the ‘al-
ienability’ of human rights.  This Part describes two existing sugges-
tions for how to respond to the problems inherent in U.S. practice,
212. Id. at 1112–13.
213. Id. at 1113.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Foreward to O. JOHN ROGGE, OUR VANISHING CIVIL
LIBERTIES 7 (1949) (“T[he] Anglo-American tradition of civil liberties is one of the greatest
contributions ever made to civilized life.  To that tradition the American people must look for
assurance of freedom in which to realize the full development of the human spirit.  In that tradi-
tion we must seek the guiding principles for living together in a modern democratic society.
America’s prestige throughout the world rests far more upon its achievement in securing politi-
cal and civil rights than upon the fading glories or the ‘free enterprise system’ or any other
phase of its political life.”).
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and proposes a third that builds heavily upon the socio–structural
theory.216
Solutions to the controversies over conditional consent must be
in accordance with international and domestic law as described in
Part I; they should strike a reasonable balance between the national
and international norms and interests described in Part II; and, ide-
ally, they should respond to existing threats to human rights protec-
tion.
A. Two Existing Approaches: “Pulling the Rug Out” From Under
the Senate and Reforming its Advice and Consent Power
The following approaches advocate, respectively, for declaring
the RUDs illegal, and for qualifying the Senate’s advice and consent
power so as to prevent the issuance of RUDs contrary to the object
and purpose of the treaty at hand.  Although both are plausible, it is
ultimately concluded that neither would be responsive to the question
of protecting domestic human rights.  An explanation of the legal ba-
sis for the first approach leads to an explanation of the second.
If the Senate’s declaration of non-self-execution exempts the
United States from its obligations under the treaty, it could not prop-
erly be termed a “declaration,” defined as “a statement of policy,
purpose, or position related to the subject matter of the treaty but not
necessarily affecting its provisions,”217 but would instead be a “reser-
vation,” defined as “a limitation, qualification, or contradiction of the
obligations in the treaty, especially as they relate to the party making
the reservation.”218  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law confirms this view, noting that anything that excludes, limits, or
modifies treaty obligations is in fact a reservation, regardless of what
a State chooses to call it.219  This might apply to the Senate’s declara-
tion of non-self-execution, because the HRTs stipulate the protection
of individual rights of the people in the control of the States Parties,
including, presumably, some rights additional to constitutional pro-
216. See Part IIC, supra.
217. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report on the Salt II Treaty, S. EXEC. Doc No.
96-14, at 34 (1979) [hereinafter Report on the Salt II Treaty].
218. Id.  See also General Comment 24, supra note 90, ¶ 3 (referencing Article 2(1)(d) of the
Vienna Convention, supra note 30 (“If a statement, irrespective of its name or title, purports to
exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in its application to the State, it constitutes a reser-
vation.”).
219. See supra note 29.
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tections,220 and the provision of an impartial forum capable of pro-
viding a responsive remedy.221  If the Senate’s reservation to the defi-
nition of “cruel and unusual punishment” were to be invalidated, then
the non-self-execution reservation would also be invalid.  This is so
because the treaty would then require protection against a more ex-
pansive notion of cruel and unusual punishment, yet the United
States has asserted that no individual right of action will be permitted
and no implementing legislation is contemplated.  Since existing U.S.
law does not protect against cruel and unusual punishment as con-
ceived of internationally, then the reservation could be contrary to
the object and purpose of the treaty.
In that case, the question becomes whether the Senate’s reserva-
tion, which the Senate prefers to term a “declaration,” binds U.S.
courts in their interpretation of the treaty.  The argument has been
advanced that since treaties are the law of the land—not “treaties and
invalid declarations”—only the qualifications made to the treaty that
are valid under international law should be applied as the law of the
land.  As defined by the Vienna Convention, a treaty is an interna-
tional instrument governed by international law.222  As such, an inva-
lid declaration or reservation would not be part of the treaty and
therefore would not be binding upon U.S. courts.  This view is com-
patible with a fair reading of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Re-
lations Law, which states that a reservation is part of the treaty and
becomes law in the United States if the reservation is effective under
the principles of section 313.223  Section 313, like the Vienna Conven-
tion and CIL, excludes reservations incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty.224
Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott suggest, in their reading of Su-
preme Court and Court of Appeals’ precedents, that it was for a time
considered that “Senate pronouncements which do not have interna-
tional legal significance would likewise lack domestic legal signifi-
cance” but that the prevailing view is that the Senate’s “authority to
impose the condition implies that it must be given effect in the consti-
220. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
221. See ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 2(2) and 2(3)(A).
222. The Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 2(1)(a) (“‘[T]reaty’ means an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation.”) (emphasis added).
223. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 314 cmt. b (1986).
224. Id. § 313 cmt. c.
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tutional system.”225
Under a contract theory, and perhaps even under a legislation
theory, the result of a finding that RUDs were invalid would result in
releasing the State from the treaty, since the RUDs were a condition
to the state’s consent to be bound.  The U.S. political branches might
argue that a contrary holding, such as that recently given by the
European Court of Human Rights in Belilos,226 discarding RUDs de-
clared invalid and holding the State to the entire treaty,227 would be
destructive to the international system as States could be more ad-
verse to enter into any agreement that might at some point be con-
strued in a way imperfectly suited to their interests.228  Nevertheless,
this is the policy endorsed by the HRC: “The normal consequence of
an unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in ef-
fect at all for a reserving party.  Rather, such a reservation will gener-
ally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be operative for
the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.”229  The United
States responded that “reservations are an essential part of a State’s
consent to be bound.”230  The HRC’s policy, limited to unacceptable
reservations, is not in tension with the ICCPR that, along with the
other HRTs in question, allows reservations.  This allowance “reflects
a strategy of garnering the greatest possible adherence to the precepts
of the treaty by allowing states to undertake some of the treaty’s pro-
visions while rejecting others.”231  The HRC’s policy requires states to
225. Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Symposium on Parliamentary Participa-
tion in the Making and Operation of Treaties: United States: The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 593–95 (1991) (dis-
cussing Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 178–80 (1901), New York Indians v.
United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1898), and American Pub. Power Ass’n v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64
(1957).
226. 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 466
227. See id.
228. This argument would look something like this: A treaty is a template produced by
states, non-governmental organizations and international civil servants in accordance with their
interests and assessments of the issues.  Parties are free to custom tailor its terms, unless pre-
cluded by the treaty’s text, to their goals as determined by their domestic political processes.
The United States has never given its consent to make HRTs self-executing or to apply any
meaning of the treaty terms to which it has reserved besides that conveyed by its RUDs.  Hu-
man rights advocates and internationalists may do a disservice to their causes by arguing that
courts should invalidate RUDs entered by the United States to the HRTs to which it is party.
229. General Comment 24, supra note 90, ¶ 18.
230. See Redgwell, supra note 35 n.37, quoting the U.S. response, 3 INT’L H.R. REP. 269
(1996).
231. Madeline Morris, Few Reservations About Reservations, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341, 342
(2000).
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issue reservations at their own peril.
The basic spectrum of possible approaches to reservations con-
trary to the object and purpose of the treaty could thus be summa-
rized as follows: (1) the “gotcha” approach, whereby invalid reserva-
tions are stripped and the state is held to the treaty’s full terms;232 (2)
the “one-size fits all” approach, whereby each treaty would be ac-
companied by a “guide to reservations practice” stipulating accept-
able reservations practice;233 (3) the “custom tailoring” approach,
whereby reservations objected to by States Parties are respected and
the relevant articles simply cease to operate vis–à–vis the reserving
and objecting states;234 and (4) the “boot” approach, whereby a party’s
membership in a treaty is revoked.
The “gotcha” approach contradicts the principles of treaty law as
understood by the United States.  The Supreme Court in Foster and
Percheman, affirmed that the mutual intent of the parties determines
whether a given provision of a treaty is self-executing.235  Similarly,
such an approach is at odds with one of the two most basic principles
of treaty law—consent to be bound.236  If clearly expressed, the nego-
tiated conditions that define the voluntary obligations a country as-
sumes, are understood to be a precondition to the continued exis-
tence of said obligations.  Since the U.S.’ intent is clearly expressed
and on the record (a precondition to ratification), a reviewing court
would not have to examine the treaty’s text.  Other states could not
have intended the treaty to be self-executing as it applies to the
United States if they were apprised of the clear impossibility of the
232. See, e.g., Belilos, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 466, and General Comment 24, supra note 90.
233. See Redgwell, supra note 35, at 414 (discussing the reservations guide advocated by a
special Rapporteur).
234. See, e.g., Reservations to the Genocide Convention case; Vienna Convention, supra note
30, arts. 20–21.
235. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), and Percheman, 32 U.S. at 70 (“In attempting to
ascertain the true meaning of the parties, it is humbly conceived, we are not confined to the lan-
guage of the treaty; we may look into the negotiations which preceded it.  In this instance, there
is a particular propriety in doing so.  As the instrument of ratification, an essential part of the
whole treaty, refers to the history of the negotiation, it lets in the whole of that history, as mat-
ter to be adverted to, according to all the strictness of legal argument, in reasoning on the con-
struction of the claim in question.”).
236. Arguably, the other would be pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept).  See Vi-
enna Convention, supra note 30, pmbl. & art. 26.  If, prior to ratification, a state was made
aware of the possibility that if their reservations were to be struck down, the provision reserved
to would be applied to them in full, then the ruling would be acceptable as applied to the cur-
rent topic.  It is understood that the European system is different from the U.S. system and that
an analysis of the ruling in its proper context (i.e., in the European system, rather than the U.S.
system) might yield a different conclusion.
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same.237
Advocates of the “gotcha” approach must bear in mind the unin-
tended consequences of enforcing upon a state obligations to which it
did not consent, or could not reasonably be construed as having con-
sented.  For example, the United States might cease to advocate for
human rights treaties and fail to join future treaties.  This latter impli-
cation, however, seems increasingly irrelevant as U.S. “exceptional-
ism” grows.238  Nevertheless, even strong human rights proponents,
such as Professor Louis Henkin, maintain that in a multilateral treaty,
a reservation or understanding embodies the intent of the party and
this intent is used to interpret what obligations that party under-
took.239
The “gotcha” approach seeks to steamroll over the disjuncture
between the Senate power as understood by the Senate and, pre-
sumably, the Supreme Court, and the official interpretation of appli-
cable rights and duties under international law.  The approach is only
useful, insofar as its execution constitutes judicial notice of a problem
in need of resolution and reminds the political branches that the Con-
237. An exception to this general rule could be the imposition of a jus cogens norm on non-
consenting states, such as the United States.  Some would assume that this concern only applies
to future changes in jus cogens norms because for now, all jus cogens prohibitions—on torture,
genocide, slavery, piracy, and racial discrimination, for example—find a robust ally in U.S. do-
mestic law.  These uncontroversial examples of jus cogens norms are commonly cited.  See, e.g.,
JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 23
(2003) (“Although there is no specification as to what constitutes such a norm, fundamental
rights such as the right of all peoples to self-determination, and the prohibition of slavery, geno-
cide, torture and racial discrimination represent settled jus cogens examples.”).  Unfortunately,
this view is naive, since a strong case can be made that the prohibition on the execution of mi-
nors constitutes such a norm and this norm has no counterpart in U.S. domestic law.  Interview
with Professor David Weissbrodt in Geneva, Switzerland (July 26, 2002).  The HRC has in fact
specified that “provisions in the Covenant that represent customary international law, (and a
fortiori when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reserva-
tions. . . .  Accordingly a State may not reserve the right to execute pregnant women or chil-
dren.”  General Comment 24 (52), supra note 90, ¶ 8.
238. Jane Perlez, Here’s One Treaty That the Bush Team Loves, to Death, NEW YORK
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, at 3 (“The Bush administration has irritated many allies with its aversion
to treaties, especially the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and the 1972 Antiballistic Missile
Treaty.”); Kenneth Roth, Is America’s withdrawal from the new International Criminal Court
justified?, WORLD LINK, July 17, 2002, available at http://www.worldlink.co.uk/stories/
storyReader$1146 (last visited Apr. 6, 2003) (“In repudiating Bill Clinton’s signature on the
treaty to establish an international criminal court, the Bush administration has taken an
audacious step.  The move suggests that a radically new vision is guiding American foreign
policy: that the United States, with its extraordinary power, is no longer served by the
international rule of law.”).
239. See HENKIN, supra note 74, at 201.
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stitution makes international law “our law.”240
A less severe approach would emanate from the legislature and
would serve to qualify the Senate’s power such that the Senate would
be required to consider the international legality of their actions on
the international front.  Just as the legislature is bound to consider the
constitutionality of its legislation,241 the Senate and President should
also make at least a passing effort to consider the legality of the
RUDs upon which they insist.
This approach has been advanced by Professors Riesenfeld and
Abbott and summarized as follows: “Since the Senate by itself has no
domestic law–making powers, it should not be considered to have an-
cillary domestic legislative powers as part of its treaty–approving
function.  Rather, it can attach only such conditions as could validly
form part of the treaty on the international plane.”242  If this view of
the law were formally adopted, “the Senate would lack power to at-
tach conditions inimical to the treaty under international law and,
moreover, would lack authority to control the domestic effect of trea-
ties, including whether a treaty should be considered self-executing or
not.”243  This proposal is favorable in its democratic appeal, yet unsat-
isfactory in its inability to address the human rights question.
B. A New Proposal: the HRT Regime as a Double Layer of
Protection—Both a Substantive Standard and a Minimum Floor
Recall that Germany premised its ceding of domestic sovereignty
pursuant to entry into the EU on the maintenance of existing levels of
protections guaranteed by the Grundgesetz.244  Similarly, the United
States could justify its membership in the HRT regime on the basis
that the existing level of human rights protection at the time of HRT
ratification became a minimum floor.
Though the use of RUDs whittled down the protections offered
by HRTs to the level currently provided by domestic law,245 U.S.
membership would be made meaningful if that level of protection be-
240. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
241. Justice Anthony Kennedy, Remarks at Duke University School of Law (Nov. 18, 2002),
available, in part, at http://www.law.duke.edu/features/news_kennedy.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2003).
242. Lori Fisler Damrosch, In Honor of Stefan A. Riesenfeld, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 589, 595–96 (1997).
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
245. But see implementing legislation, supra note 12.
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came a substantive standard to be upheld.  Otherwise, it would consti-
tute an illusory promise (“the U.S. agrees to do what it already
does—for only as long as it wishes—for reasons unrelated to this
agreement”).  To say, however, that “the United States agrees to do
at least what it already does and no less for perpetuity” would indeed
constitute consideration for a contract or a dutiful implementation of
international legislation.246  Although, as the Senate desired, no action
would be necessary and no increase in rights would be contemplated,
the obligation to never stoop below current levels of protection would
be undertaken and implementing legislation would be due upon a de-
crease in the protection offered by the domestic laws that imple-
mented the HRTs in the moment of ratification.
It is indisputable that the United States, upon ratification of the
HRTs, undertook an obligation under international law to provide
some ascertainable level of protection.  Subsequent to the date of
ratification of the relevant HRTs, the United States became obli-
gated, somewhat paradoxically, to uphold its own existing domestic
laws as a matter of international law.  Its treaty partners bound them-
selves under international law to upholding a less qualified, and hence
higher international standard.  As in the case of the United Kingdom
post September 11th,247 these partners became obligated to notify the
United Nations of any derogations from their new standard.248  They
thus faced international shaming and blaming—detriments to their
reputation and acknowledgments of their failure to live up to the
standards that the world, in its overwhelming majority, has deter-
246. See analysis of contracts verses legislation, Part II, supra.
247. See United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Reservations and Declara-
tions: CCPR, at 6–7, available at http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/uk_t2_ccpr.pdf (last visited Apr.
6, 2003) (“There exists a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from persons suspected of in-
volvement in international terrorism. . . .  As a result, a public emergency, within the meaning of
article 4(1) of the Covenant, exists in the United Kingdom. . . .  As a result of the public emer-
gency, provision is made in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, inter alia, for an
extended power to arrest and detain a foreign national . . . with the consequence that the deten-
tion would be unlawful under existing domestic law powers.  The extended power to arrest and
detain will apply where the Secretary of State issues a certificate indicating his belief that the
person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national security and that he suspects the
person of being an international terrorist.”).
248. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4(3) (“Any State Party to the present Covenant
availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the
present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of
the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated.  A fur-
ther communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it ter-
minates such derogation.”).
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mined to be necessary for the protection of human dignity.249  The
United States, despite exempting itself from the international stan-
dard, also became obligated to report any derogation from the stan-
dard they agreed to—the level of domestic protection offered at the
time of ratification.
The procedural modus operandi of the U.S. system quickly
breaks down when pushed to its potential limit—namely, nothing
stops human rights as codified in U.S. law from being modified
through the common law or statute.  The most probable of all possi-
ble scenarios to this effect is that the bill of rights will be eroded
through judicial decisions that take advantage of the Constitution’s
brevity and related lack of substantive standards for what such rights
are to mean.250
In contrast, Germany and the HRC tend to insist on substantive
standards.  The German “fighting democracy”251 is an example of this.
As noted previously, it requires that constitutional amendments,
passed in accordance with the stipulated rules, be declared unconsti-
tutional if they so qualify a basic right; that political parties be out-
lawed if their goals are determined to be sufficiently contrary, sub-
stantively speaking, to the required standards of rights protections;
249. The requisite seriousness of a situation for derogation to be warranted is reflected in
the HRC’s comments:
When a public emergency which threatens the life of a nation arises and it is officially
proclaimed, a State party may derogate from a number of rights to the extent strictly
required by the situation.  The State party, however, may not derogate from certain
specific rights and may not take discriminatory measures on a number of grounds.  The
State party is also under an obligation to inform the other States parties immedi-
ately . . . measures taken under article 4 are of an exceptional and temporary nature
and may only last as long as the life of the nation concerned is threatened and that, in
times of emergency, the protection of human rights becomes all the more important,
particularly those rights from which no derogations can be made. . . .  [I]t is equally
important for States parties, in times of public emergency, to inform the other States
parties of the nature and extent of the derogations they have made and of the reasons
therefor and, further, to fulfil their reporting obligations under article 40 of the Cove-
nant by indicating the nature and extent of each right derogated from together with
the relevant documentation.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 5 (4), ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
(1981).
250. See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.  Less probable, but still possible sce-
narios include: the passage of a constitutional amendment repealing, in part or in full, the Bill of
Rights or materially altering its content to the detriment of human rights protections; the alter-
ing of the federal courts’ jurisdiction by Congress to exclude judicial meddling with the major-
ity’s plan to strip certain individual rights; and a choice by courts, fearing the crisis that would
result were their rulings ignored and unenforced, not to intervene.
251. See Part II(A)(3), supra.
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and that human dignity remain the master value of the entire consti-
tutional order, imposing both positive and negative duties on the
state.  Substantive legitimacy requires that certain standards be up-
held, regardless of whatever passions might surge within the hearts
and minds of legislators or their citizen support base.252
In this same way, largely symbolic participation in HRTs could
be rendered meaningful in light of a subsequent decline in human
rights protection within the United States.  Such membership ceases
to be merely symbolic if U.S. RUDs are understood to reference the
static, as opposed to temporally unstable, state of rights protections.
If, subsequent to ratification, the United States were to decrease its
human rights protections—for example, by effectively repealing ha-
beas corpus—it is inconceivable that its obligations pursuant to the
ICCPR (or HRTs generally), even as reserved to, would automati-
cally bend to the new standard.253  Rather, U.S. human rights obliga-
tions pursuant to its membership in the treaty would remain at the
level found at the time of ratification—that is, the level offered by
domestic law on the date of ratification.  Hence, the United States
cannot decrease its level of human rights protection without either
showing that derogation is legal given changed circumstances or vio-
lating international law.  This statement is generous in that it assumes
at the outset the legitimacy of U.S. reservations.
Recall that implementing legislation, as stated in the Senate re-
port, was not contemplated because the United States “generally
complies with” certain HRT obligations.254  It follows that if U.S. law
ceases to generally comply with those obligations, the United States
would be required to give notice of derogation or issue implementing
legislation.  Some reservations, such as the second reservation to the
ICCPR, which  reserves the right to impose capital punishment, ref-
erence the potentiality of “future laws” that could provide for said
252. Interestingly, Madisonian principles have, at least implicitly, been couched as justifica-
tions for non-adherence to HRTs.  See “democratic deficit” in Part II, supra.  Yet, Madison was
concerned about abuse of power, not a benevolent exercise of power leading to respect for and
guarantees of human dignity.  Anti-majoritarian rights still suffer despite, or perhaps because of,
the separation of powers.
253. The HRC has indicated, specifically with regard to the United States, that the non-self-
execution declaration filed to the ICCPR would be impermissible if in fact domestic law did not
effectively guarantee the rights codified in the ICCPR.  See Human Rights Commission, Con-
sideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Re-
port of the United States of America, U.N. GAOR,  53rd Sess., 1,401st mtg. at 9, para. 38, U.N.
Doc. No. CCPR/C/SR.1401 (1995).
254. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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imposition, seem to pre–empt the double layer theory.255  Others,
however, do not.  The third reservation is not so malleable and on its
face appears to bind the United States to the level of protection ex-
isting at the time of ratification, referencing only the “cruel and un-
usual treatment . . . prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”256  The same
is true of the first reservation to CAT, essentially identical to the for-
mer.257
Interestingly, and most promisingly for attributing some signifi-
cance to U.S. participation in HRTs, the United States submitted
upon ratification of CAT an understanding recognizing the impermis-
sibility of domestic sanctions on behalf of a State Party that defeat the
object and purpose of that convention.258  This, the most obvious and
established duty of treaty membership, does theoretically render
HRTs meaningful for people within the United States.  The duty, in-
cumbent upon treaty members, not to defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty applies not only to reservations entered, but to state prac-
tice subsequent to ratification.259
Therefore, implementing legislation is now legally due, incum-
bent upon the United States to so issue, insofar as its domestic human
rights protections have declined subsequent to encapsulation in the
corresponding HRTs at the moment of ratification.
The use of HRTs to set and uphold a minimum substantive stan-
dard fits squarely within U.S. domestic law, responds to States’ rights
challenges, and fortifies the easily erodable constitutional protections
upon which domestic human rights rely.  This usage remedies the in-
ternational legal flaws in U.S. participation in HRTs by creating non–
illusory obligations and implementing a treatment of HRTs that com-
ports with their object and purpose.
The minimum floor should merely be the level of constitutional
protection for domestic human rights that existed at the time of ratifi-
cation.  This floor could of course be superseded by subsequent leg-
255. See RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 7.
256. Id. (emphasis added).
257. Id.
258. Id. (“Nonetheless, the United States understands that a State party could not through
its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the convention to prohibit torture.”).
259. See Vienna Convention, supra note 30, arts. 19(c) (stating that reservations incompati-
ble with the treaty’s object and purpose are never permissible) and 18(a) (obligating even mere
signatories not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty).
KUHNER.DOC 09/03/03  5:02 PM
2003] HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN U.S. LAW 473
islation by Congress;260 however, enacting legislation under the guises
of increasing security with no perceivable detriment to human rights
protective treaties or acts is far more politically viable than when such
legislation supersedes human rights guarantees.  A diffuse and largely
hypothetical impact means very little as compared to a specific and
tangible effect.  In addition to increasing the cost to the state of in-
fringing those rights, a minimum floor approach could facilitate a cul-
tural attachment to definitive rights and greater political will to re-
spect the same.  Embodied in implementing legislation or separate
statute, a minimum floor would provide something to which defend-
ers of liberty might hold up and use as leverage to gain legitimacy and
visibility.  It would do the same for our allies and the U.N. treaty
bodies.  This being the case, formal acknowledgement that the United
States is in fact bound, per international agreement, to offer the
amount of human rights protection embodied in the HRTs to its citi-
zens would not, as a practical matter, be a trivial legal development.
Nor would it be a trivial development as a matter of social struc-
ture and legal theory.  U.S. success in achieving a high level of free-
dom and well–being for its populace has commonly been interpreted
as a result which must necessarily follow from its political structure.
To the extent that this political structure has influenced the hearts
and minds of the populace and the legislators, and kept the vices of
human nature under control—properly incentivized to seek the per-
missible types of individual advantage—it is possible to assert that the
structure has produced its desired result.  But it cannot be stated that
this result, which includes reasonable human rights protections, will
necessarily be reproduced as the political machinery continues to
churn through the unknown waters before us.261
260. See last-in-time doctrine, supra note 23.
261. A concrete issue is that the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act], could be followed up with even more extreme
legislation.  Democratic popularity enjoys a stranglehold on substantive outcomes to the extent
that those outcomes are achieved by legitimate procedural steps.  These steps contain no check
on intentions or outcomes.  And hence, there is nothing to prevent the repealing of human
rights in the post–September 11th climate, or in some other future climate unfavorable to mi-
nority rights.  Great debate already surrounds the Act itself.  See, e.g., Panel Discussion with
Congressman Barney Frank, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, Professor David
Cole, Mr. Stuart Taylor, Jr., and Ms. Beth Wilkinson, The USA-PATRIOT Act and the Ameri-
can Response to Terror: Can we Protect Civil Liberties After September 11?, 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1501 (2002); John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for
“Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice De-
partment’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081 (2002).
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In a prescient dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Bran-
deis remarked, with regard to wire–tapping during the Prohibition
era, that
it is . . . immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement.
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-
erty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.  Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil–
minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well–meaning but without under-
standing.262
This observation was reconfirmed during one of the next periods of
domestic human rights abuse.  In 1949, Dr. O. John Rogge, detailing
the ‘vanishment of our civil liberties,’ noted the incremental nature of
danger to such rights and the contexts in which such danger manifests:
“Insiduously, step by step, the enemies of our civil liberties have ad-
vanced behind the poisonous smoke–screen of the ‘Communist
threat’.”263  The origin and strength of current threats to domestic
human rights is beyond the scope of this article, but has been the
subject of great concern.264
262. 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928); Cf., John Brady Kiesling, U.S. Diplomat’s Letter of Resigna-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/27/international/
27WEB-TNAT.html (last visited May 19, 2003) (positing that such men of great zeal may not be
well–meaning).
263. ROGGE, supra note 215, at 275.  Dr. Rogge served as Assistant General Counsel to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Assistant U.S. Attorney General in charge of the
Criminal Division before taking on the sedition case, investigating the spread of fascism and the
monopoly-cartel system.  See id. at 14–23.
264. There has arguably been a limited repealing of habeas corpus, open trials, the right to
counsel, the attorney–client privilege, equal protection, and privacy rights post September 11th.
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (4th Cir. 2003), No. 02-7338 (Jan. 8, 2003).  See generally Human Rights
Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post–September 11 Detainees, available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2003); American Civil Liberties
Union, A Second Federal Court Rejects Government Secrecy, Orders Open Immigration Hear-
ings in Post–Sept. 11 Challenge, May 29, 2002, available at http://www.aclu.
org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=10413&c=22 (last visited Apr. 6, 2003);
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls Immigrant Registration Program Pretext for Mass
Detentions, Dec. 19, 2002, available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.
cfm?ID=11503&c=206 (last visited Apr. 6, 2003); Dianne Donovan, Let’s Take Away Your
Freedom, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2001, at 19, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/liberties/
1127freedom.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2003); Charles Lane, Debate Crystallizes on War, Rights;
Courts Struggle Over Fighting vs. Defending Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2002, at A1, avail-
able at http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorandcivillib/hasbushinfringed.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
Writing in 1951, Dean Alison Reppy of New York Law School, prophesized that “if the grist of
the mill in the field of civil rights covering the contemporary scene is any criterion of the future,
we may be certain that the immediate succeeding years, clouded as they are by the overtones of
world conflict, will each produce for discussion their share of new problems involving the main-
tenance and the advancement of our civil liberties.”  ALISON REPPY, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
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A minimum floor would remove the insecurity produced by the
precarious existing standards of protection.  As Professor Thomas
Emerson stated in 1949, “[l]ike most of our ideals the theory of civil
liberties has never been fully realized in practice.  Grave discrepan-
cies have always existed between ideal and reality.  More than that, at
certain periods general hysteria has flared throughout the nation,
amounting to temporary but almost complete repudiation of the
whole tradition.”265  Emerson cites the Alien and Sedition laws used
to quash political opposition, the “frenzy” against immigrants during
the middle of the nineteenth century, the “mass convictions under the
espionage laws” during the first World War, the non–enforcement of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in the plight
of African Americans, and the issue of his day—the “intolerance,
emotion, and fear” propagated by the House Committee on Un–
American Activities.266
It would be wise to set a substantive standard to preempt the
possibility of a recurring pattern of human rights reduction or, worse,
the possibility of a downward spiral.  The operative logic is akin to
Ulysses binding himself to the mast.  It responds to the problem of
“time inconsistency, where actors know that they will not be able to
live up to desirable courses of action in the future unless they take
some action to bind themselves today.”267  All that is required is the
will to do so.
Timothy K. Kuhner
UNITED STATES 266 (1951).  It bears mentioning that the “war on terror” did not begin with a
declaration of war by Congress, nor is it likely to conclude in the signing of a treaty between the
United States on one side of the table and all terrorists, present and future, on the other.
Rather, much like the “war on drugs,” this war could be a long-standing feature of life in the
United States.  See ACLU v. U.S. Gen. Services Admin., 235 F. Supp. 2d. 816, 817 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (“As this Court noted when it gave preliminary approval to this settlement, our Constitu-
tion was not among the list of endless casualties suffered by our country on September 11, 2001.
This lawsuit, like many others our brother and sister colleagues have confronted since the pro-
foundly tragic events of September 11, 2001, involves the complex tension between national se-
curity and personal freedom.  This tension is not new to our court system; indeed, our courts
repeatedly have been faced with attempts to curtail civil liberties in the face of perceived threats
to our national well-being. . . .  It is critical that courts again heighten their overall vigilance and
willingness to uphold our constitutional freedoms during this turbulent period of our history.”) .
265. Emerson, supra note 215, at 7.
266. Id. at 7–8.
267. See MARTIN, supra note 65, at 64 (discussing commitment mechanisms that guarantee
certainty, despite the instability of preferences).
